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Chapter 1
Introdution
1.1 Bankrupty laws and reditor rights prote-tionA rm's insolveny is an inevitable element of the market eonomy. A legal frame-work for enforement of ontrats in the ase of a rm's insolveny is providedby bankrupty laws.1 Bankrupty laws not only protet the reditor's rights andimpose nanial disipline on managers, but also free assets from ineient useand provide a resolution of debtor's laims, so that its resoure an be used fornew projets (Buttwill and Wihlborg, 2005).However, the design of bankrupty regimes diers substantially aross oun-tries in many respets. These dierenes reet path dependeny of legal andeonomi systems as well as the fat that the framework for bankrupty has de-veloped as the result of bargaining among various interests groups. We observethat the divergene in the design of bankrupty laws is relatively signiant evenamong ountries with relatively similar legal systems and ommon tradition, suh1Comparison of reent theories on personal and orporate bankrupty an be found in White(2005). In our work we fous on the problem of orporate bankrupty.5
as the U.S. and the U.K.2The bankrupty laws dier not only aross ountries but also over time. We ob-serve onsiderable dereases in penalties for delaring bankrupty (Begrlof et al.,2001). In Anient Rome the penalty for bankrupty was death or slavery. Inthe Middle Ages the punishment was signiantly softened.3 In the 18th entury,rst bankrupty law was adopted in England, still ontaining imprisonment asa ommon punishment. The rst bankrupty law allowing for a modern reor-ganization proedure was not introdued until 1978, by Chapter 11 in U.S. law(Djankov et al., 2003). In reent deades most of the industrial nations amendedtheir bankrupty laws, implementing various kinds of reorganization proedures.4The general trend towards moving from regimes with strit reditor protetion toa more debtor-friendly approah is also reported in Westbrook (2001).In general, we an distinguish bankrupty laws in the dimension of toughness(stritness) of the law on the debtor, whih atually reets the dierent degrees ofreditor rights protetion. Bankrupty laws usually balane protetion of reditorrights, whih is essential for the mobilization of apital for investment, while re-straining premature liquidation of viable businesses (Claessen et al., 2001). Viableenterprises an be kept in business by implementation of reorganization proeduresinstead of liquidation; that, however, limits the reditor's rights.1.1.1 Why do we need bankrupty laws?The bankrupty law ertainly interferes with debtor's and reditor's rights. Whydo we need bankrupty laws that restrit the ontrat among debtor and reditor?2The dierenes between the Amerian and British bankrupty regimes are desribed indetail in White (1996) or Buttwill and Wihlborg (2005). Claessen et al. (2001) mention thatthe U.S. Bankrupty At of 1800 was a opy of the English law. Today, however, the U.S. lawwith Chapter 11 is more debtor oriented ompared to reditor oriented British law.3Bankrupt debtors were usually publily humiliated, pilloried and put into prison. In Englandthey often had one ear ut (Djankov et al., 2003)4Italy 1979, Frane 1985, the United Kingdom 1986, New Zealand 1989, Australia andCanada 1992, Germany 1994 and 1999, Sweden 1996, Japan and Mexio 2000, to name a few.6
Why an the parties not write their own spei ontrat dealing with the problemof a rm's insolveny? Standard justiation for bankrupty law is the argumentof multiple reditors. Usually we observe that a debtor has obligations to morethan one reditor. Without the state-guaranteed rule for insolveny, reditorswould be motivated to run on assets, as the rm's assets are usually not suientto over all reditors' laims. This an lead to premature liquidation and soiallynot optimal destrution of value. Bankrupty law thus solves the oordinationproblem among reditors setting rules for all reditors.The question that follows is why does a rm have multiple reditors. Thereare several papers pointing to the multiple reditors setting arising endogenouslyfrom the nanial ontrating. Berglöf et al. (2003), for example, develop a modelof an inomplete-ontrats framework with imperfet renegotiation. It shows thathaving multiple reditors inreases a rm's debt apaity while dereasing thedebtor's inentives to default strategially. The need for bankrupty laws thusarises endogenously as the inonsisteny of reditors' laims is a result of optimalontrat design.51.1.2 Eient bankrupty proeduresNo agreement exists on, how the optimal bankrupty regime should be designed.However, Claessen et al. (2001) mention that ...badly written odes make every-body worse o . Whether the optimal method of dealing with bankrupty is toliquidate the rm, to sell it as a on-going onern or to start a reorganizationplan is losely onneted to asymmetri information about the ause of distress(Buttwill and Wihlborg, 2005). The distintion between eonomi and nanialdistress is ruial. Eonomi distress means that the net value of the rm is neg-ative and from an eonomi point of view the rm should be shut down. In thease of nanial distress the net present value of the rm is positive, but urrent5Similar onlusions are found by Bolton and Sharfstein (1996).7
ash ows exeed the value of the rm's debts. The rm is insolvent as it annotpay bak its obligations, but its value from the soial point of view is positive.In the ase of nanial distress, restruturing or other forms of debt negotiationare soially optimal, while in the ase of eonomi distress liquidation would beoptimal. If the rm is in nanial distress, the liquidation is regarded as ineientfrom the soial point of view.6The role of an inappropriate bankrupty regime is often mentioned as a reasonof a deepness for the nanial rises. The East Asian nanial risis 1997-1998have raised the question of how to deal with the resolution of nanial distressand emphasized the debate on the optimal bankrupty regime. Aording tomany authors, an absene of the appropriate bankrupty regime in the East Asianountries onsiderably ompliated the proess of orporate restruturing after therises (Claessens et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2001), Stiglitz (2001), Fagan et al.(2001)). They point out that even if the bankrupty proedures are not used forrestruturing, they determine the speed and extent of restruturing. Instead ofresolving their debts through bankrupty, most of the ompanies in East Asiaused out-of-ourt negotiations.7 An appropriate extent of reorganization versusliquidation in the bankrupty law has been heavily disussed in the ontext of theU.S. Bankrupty At Chapter 11 (reorganization) and Chapter 7 (liquidation).8The topi of reorganization versus liquidation was very important in transitionountries in the beginning of the transition period, when many ompanies beomeeonomially distressed due to the ineient prodution and nanially distressedbeause of the dramati hanges in the eonomy. In Chapter 2 of this thesis we6For example, Knot and Vyhodil (2004) points at the ase of many East Asian rms thathad their debts denominated in foreign urreny. These eonomially sound rms got in troubleas the loal urreny depreiated. Liquidation of these rms would be soially not optimal.7Only 6 per ent of nanially distressed ompanies in Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, and Thai-land resolved their debts through bankrupty, the rest used out-of-ourt renegotiation (Claessenset al., 2001).8Among advoates of the Chapter 11 belong, for example, Giammarino and Nosal (1999),Berglöf et al. (2003), Berkovith et al. (1998) and Brown (1989). The Chapter 11 has beenritiized by e.g. Baird and Rasmussen (2003), Bebhuk (1988), Hart (2000) and Aghion et al.(1992). 8
analyze the deision on the optimal bankrupty proedure in transition ountriesin ontext of privatization methods.1.1.3 Creditor-friendly vs. debtor-friendly bankrupty lawsThe debate whether the bankrupty regime should favor liquidation or reorgani-zation is a part of the general disussion about debtor- versus reditor-friendlybankrupty approahes. We talk about a reditor-friendly (tough) bankruptylaw if the proedure favors the reditor, giving him substantial rights in seizingthe assets of an insolvent rm. Suh a proedure prefers liquidation as this equalstaking possession of rm's assets. A bankrupty law supporting reorganizationproedure is onsidered to be debtor-friendly (soft), as this limits the reditor'srights substantially and retains some ontrol rights by the debtor.Considering the optimal bankrupty proedure, we annot fous only on theex-post view aording to whih we maximize the value of the insolvent rm forall stakeholders (debtor, reditors, employees et.). We also have to take intoaount ex-ante eets, so that the proedure enourages managers to indueeort in paying bak the debt, and reditors from giving imprudent redits. Theex-ante eets are sometimes onsidered as even more important. As Stiglitz(2001) mentioned, it is ruial to onsider the behavior inentives bankruptylaws reate and not only whether the odes are fair or not.If we onsider the ex-post eieny point of view, it is not soially optimalto give all ontrol rights to the reditor. Biais and Mariotti (2003) show that thereditor does not internalize all osts of its ations. He, for example, does nottake into aount the soial osts of liquidation and might deide to shut down aninsolvent rm, although it would be optimal to reorganize this rm and keep it inbusiness. Another reason, stressed by Berkovith and Israel (1999), is the infor-mational advantage of the urrent rm's management. If the rm was hit by anexternal shok, the management, having the best information about the ompany,9
has the best hane of reorganizing the rm and ontinuing operation.9 Moreover,if the manager loses the ontrol in the insolvent rm due to the tough bankruptylaw, he might be motivated to arry out risky ations to avoid bankrupty (Hart,2000).On the other hand, keeping a lot of ontrol in the debtor's hands distortsthe debtor's ex-ante inentives and aggravates the problem of moral hazard ofnanial ontrating. If the debtor knows that he stays in ontrol even in thease of bankrupty, he is less motivated to avoid it. Soft bankrupty laws keepingstrong ontrol rights by the management an also be used by debtors to esapethe lenders. Moreover, aounting for the ex-ante eieny, we have to onsiderhow the reditor adjusts his behavior before he gives the redit. If the reditor'srights are signiantly limited and the reditor annot easily aess ollateralizedassets, his willingness to give redit is dereased, he inreases the prie of theredit possibly leading to redit rationing.10 The eet of redit rationing dueto a debtor-oriented bankrupty law is desribed by Biais and Mariotti (2003).They study bankrupty in a general equilibrium framework, taking into aountthe interations between the redit and the labor markets. They nd that a softbankrupty law worsens redit rationing but still an maximize soial welfare.Povel (1999) analyzes the tradeo between manager's eort levels and hisdeision to delay bankrupty ling. He ompares two regimes of tough and softbankrupty laws and nds that when the law is soft managers do not ineientlydelay bankrupty ling, however they exert lower eort in performing the projet.In the ase of the tough law, managers never le for bankrupty as they wouldlose their jobs, but they have high inentives to exert eort.9Studying the ex-post eets of a bankrupty law, it is also very important to onsider theosts of bankrupty. Several studies exist examining empirially diret and indiret osts ofbankrupty and nd them substantial (e.g. Warner (1977), Altman (1984), Bris et al. (2005)).10Cornelli and Felli (1997a) suggest a framework to analyze ex-ante and ex-post eienyof bankrupty proedures. They show that the denition of reditors rights over the ompanyand the protetion of the reditors' seniority are ruial to assess the ex-ante eieny of abankrupty proedure. 10
The role of the ollateral and the bankrupty law that ats as a paymentinentives for the entrepreneur is studied by Bester (1994). His model investigateshow the prospet of debt renegotiation aets both the reditor's and the debtor'sbehavior. In hapter 3 of this dissertation we extend the the model of Bester (1994)and onsider the bankrupty law as an endogenous variable. We examine theatual eet of the toughness of the bankrupty law on the number of liquidations.One of the basi questions for the design of bankrupty law onerns whetherthe value of an insolvent ompany should be divided in aordane with absolutepriority rule (APR). The APR implies that all reditors must be paid in full beforeequity holders reeive anything and also determines the priorities among reditorsand requires that higher-priority reditors be repaid in full before lower-rankingreditors reeive anything (White, 2005).Bolton and Sharfstein (1996) and Bebhuk and Piker (1993) point out thatthe violation of the absolute priority rule may enhane ex-ante eieny underlimited liability. Bebhuk (2002) analyzes what the negative eets on ex antedeisions taken by shareholders are if we deviate from the absolute priority rule.He nds that the deviation aggravates the moral hazard problem and inreasesthe manager's inentive to favor risky projets. Weiss (1990) presents empirialevidene of osts of APR violation on a sample of New York Stok Exhange rmsling for bankrupty between 1979 and 1986.Berkovith and Israel (1999) study how the dierenes aross eonomi systemsin the transpareny of information on fundamentals and the managers' ability touse private information inuene the government's deision on the toughness ofthe bankrupty law. They proposed a regime where only the reditor an le forbankrupty for bank-oriented eonomies, while market-oriented eonomies shouldinlude hapters allowing the debtor as well as the reditor to le for bankrupty.
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1.1.4 Empirial observationsLa Porta et al. (1997) and reently Djankov et al. (2005) argue in their empirialstudies that the hoie of the bankrupty design is determined by the origin of thelegal system, where ountries with the Frenh ivil-law legal system tend to havesofter bankrupty laws ompare to ommon-law ountries. Besides the inueneof the legal system, the hoie of the optimal bankrupty proedure is also heavilyinuened by the politial proess. We observe that employment onsiderationshave led to favor restruturing (soft bankrupty law) over bankrupty in manyountries (Buttwill and Wihlborg, 2005). After eonomi downturns, ountriestend to avoid the osts of liquidation by implementing softer law. Berglöf et al.(2003) mention another example from the 19th entury in the U.S., where thesoftness of the bankrupty law was a reation to bankrupties of large railroadompanies. These bankrupties were onsidered to be against the publi interestas they ould have slowed down onstrution of the railroad network between Eastand West.There is also a list of studies showing the eet of bankrupty laws on theextent of redit naning and the importane for apital mobilization. Gangopad-hyay and Wihlborg (2001) nd that naning inreases with proedures favoringreditors. Similar results an be found in Rajan and Zingales (1995), La Portaet al. (1997) and Djankov et al. (2005).An important dimension of the bankrupty law is not only how the atuallaw written in books protets the reditor's rights, but also how these rights areenforeable. The enforement of law depends on the quality of the judiiarysystem and overall rule of law in the ountry. Ayotte and Yun (2006) nd intheir theoretial model that the optimal reditor protetion heavily depends onthe existing legal environment. Pistor et al. (2000) and Pistor (2000) stress theimportane of law enforement for the protetion of reditor rights in the ontextof transition ountries. They argue that the legal environment in the transition12
ountries is a muh more important determinant of the redit market size thanthe extent of reditor rights protetion written in laws.This thesis ontributes to the existing literature in several ways. We analyzedierent eets of bankrupty laws on the deision making of debtors and reditorsand onsider how these eets inuene the government's deision on the optimalbankrupty design. In partiular, we ask in Chapter 2 how the hoie of theoptimal bankrupty law is aeted by privatization poliy in transition ountries.In Chapter 3, we examine how the degree of reditor rights protetion inuenesthe number of liquidations if we take into aount the debtor's inentives to defaultstrategially. Finally, hapter 4 analyzes the inuene of bankrupty laws on thelender's deision to share information. In more detail, we study how inentives arehanged in dierent ompetition environments in the redit market. The followingsetions give a brief introdution of all three hapters.1.2 Bankrupty laws and privatization deisionsin transition ountriesAfter the breakdown of ommunism in Central and Eastern Europe, ountries inthis region faed a transition from a entral planned eonomy to a market eonomy.The transition did not inlude only the hanges in the eonomial regime butalso ontained remarkable hanges in legal and institutional settings. One of themost signiant hanges was privatization. In the ontrat theory point of view,privatization an be regarded as a government's ommitment not to subsidize aninsolvent rm. Suh a ommitment leads to higher produtive eieny (Shmidt,1996a) as the manager has inentives to avoid an insolvent situation. This proessof hardening of the rm's budget onstraint via privatization, however, might leadto liquidation, whih is ineient ex-post and thus to alloative ineieny.Chapter 2 ontributes to the existing law and nane literature analyzing13
the government hoie of the optimal bankrupty proedure in the ontext ofprivatization deision. We argue that ountries that privatized their eonomy toa large extent faed potentially high levels of liquidations. This threat motivatedgovernments in these ountries to implement poliies to mitigate the negative eetof privatization. Bankrupty laws oer a diret tool ditating how the numberof liquidations an be limited. Adopting a soft bankrupty law disourages thereditor from ling for bankrupty of an insolvent rm.11The hapter presents an idea why the hoie of a soft bankrupty law mightbe optimal from the point of view of the government that has to onsider theprivatization framework in the ountry. We argue that the transition to a marketeonomy (heavily inuened by the degree of privatization) reated a situation inwhih many rms beome nanially distressed. In suh a situation, implementinga tough bankrupty law would result in a soially ineient high number of liq-uidations. However, we have to onsider that the privatization was implementedto harden the budget onstraint and hene to inrease the produtive eieny.Adopting a soft bankrupty law softens the budget onstraint again. We take theextent of privatization as given and onsider the hoie of the bankrupty lawbalaning the trade-o between produtive and alloative eieny. We nd thatif the privatization level is high, the government prefers to limit the number ofliquidations diretly by implementing a soft bankrupty law. If the privatizationlevel is low, it pays o to motivate the managers with a tough bankrupty lawand to allow for a higher level of liquidation.We also provide empirial evidene on the relationship between the toughnessof the bankrupty law and the extent of privatization in transition ountries.Empirial evidene supports our theoretial predition that ountries with a largedegree of privatization inline to implement softer bankrupty laws.11We an also observe other ways how the government might try to mitigate the negative ef-fets of privatization. For example, in the beginning of the transition period the Czeh Republiprivatized state-owned enterprizes to a large extent but was relutant to privatize state-ownedbanks. These politially ontrolled banks were giving imprudent redits to many already priva-tized rms. 14
1.3 Bankrupty laws and debt renegotiationThe regime of bankrupty law inuenes on the number of bankrupties in theountry. The atual impat is, however, not obvious. Claessens and Klapper(2005) nd in their empirial analysis that the eet of the toughness of the bank-rupty law is heavily inuened by the quality of law enforement and judiialeieny in a ountry. In ountries with a bad judiial system, tougher bank-rupty law, giving better reditor rights protetion, leads to a higher number ofliquidations. However, in ountries with good law enforement, tougher bank-rupty law leads to a lower number of liquidations.In Chapter 3 we present a simple model of borrowing and lending with asym-metri information, where due to the possibility of renegotiation the reditor an-not redibly ommit to liquidating the debtor if the default ours. The modelaptures the prinipal-agent problem between the reditor and the debtor, whereboth parties have symmetri information about the ex-ante protability of theprojet, but the absene of state veriation reates the informational asymmetryat the time the projet is realized. We analyze the eet of the bankrupty law onthe number of liquidations. Moreover, we onsider dierent degrees of ompetitionin the redit market and examine how the ompetitive environment inuenes thenumber of liquidated rms.The model extents the model of Bester (1994) with a new modeling of therenegotiation stage aording to the soft budget onstraint literature. We treatthe bankrupty law as a one-dimensional variable that inuenes reditor's ex-peted value of assets that an be reovered. We nd that an interval of the lawexists, where the toughness is negatively orrelated with the number of liquida-tions. Tough bankrupty law inreases the payo from liquidation for the reditor.However, if the bankrupty law is not tough enough to enourage the reditor toalways initiate the liquidation, the entrepreneur might try to avoid paying bakthe redit by laiming default even if the rm is not insolvent. Inreasing the15
toughness of the law in this ase disourages the entrepreneur from suh behaviorand dereases the number of defaults. We also nd that the number of liquidationsis higher in less ompetitive environments as the prie of the redit is higher inthis ase and the entrepreneur has more inentives to avoid paying it bak. Fromthe soial point of view, softer bankrupty law is more likely to be implementedin more ompetitive environments, as the liquidation rate in more ompetitivemarkets is lower.The model presents an idea why a tough bankrupty law might lead to alower number of liquidations. Suh a relationship is observed by Claessens andKlapper (2005) in ountries with good judiial eieny. Furthermore, we extendthe analysis by examining the eet of bank ompetition. Our empirial resultssupport the ndings of the model that less ompetitive redit markets experienehigher liquidation rates.1.4 How does the bankrupty law inuene a lender'sdeision on information sharing?Credit markets are aeted by asymmetri information between lenders and bor-rowers. There are two basi views how lenders an redue the problem of asym-metri information. Aording to the rst reditor power view, power given tothe reditor by bankrupty laws matters and an redue the moral hazard prob-lem. If the reditor an more easily enfore repayment, ask for the ollateralor threaten with liquidation he is more willing to provide redit. Aording tothe seond informational view, lenders an fous on the type of asymmetri in-formation that gives rise to the problem of adverse seletion. The reditor ansolve the problem of information asymmetry by investing in sreening, monitor-ing, or obtain information about the debtors from other reditors. Djankov et al.(2005) and Jappelli and Pagano (2002) provide some empirial evidene that the16
informational and reditor power approahes might be substitutes.In hapter 4, we fous on the determinants of institutions to share informationstudying the banks' deisions to establish a private institution for informationsharing in a two-period model with moral hazard and adverse seletion problem.We analyze how the banks' deisions are inuened by the degree of bank om-petition in the redit market. The possibility that bankrupty laws providing thereditor rights protetion might be substitutes to information sharing is takeninto aount. We study the government's deision on the optimal level of bank-rupty law in dierent ompetition environment and how this deision inuenesthe banks' deision to share information.We nd that there exists a parameter spae, where a higher degree of om-petition in the banking market is assoiated with a higher degree of informationsharing. In this interval, the government has inentives to implement a toughbankrupty law to redue the moral hazard problem in a monopoly banking en-vironment in the rst period. The side-eet of the bankrupty law solves theadverse seletion problem in the seond period as bankrupty law works as asubstitute to information sharing. In a more ompetitive environment, the gov-ernment does not have suh inentives to implement tough bankrupty law. In theseond period, banks have to solve the adverse seletion problem by informationsharing.The literature on information sharing predits an opposite relationship (Jap-pelli and Pagano, 1993), i.e. banks in less ompetitive market are more likelyto share information. We present empirial evidene on the extend of privateinformation sharing in 104 ountries around the world. Using the instrumentalvariable approah that solves the problem of endogeneity we nd that ountrieswith more ompetitive banking environment have larger share of population ov-ered by private information sharing institution.
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Chapter 2
Bankrupty Laws and PrivatizationDeision in Transition Countries
2.1 IntrodutionBankrupty law design diers substantially aross ountries. On the one hand,UK and Germany are typial examples of ountries, where the main objetive ofbankrupty law is the protetion of reditors. Suh a system is seen as tough ondebtors. On the other hand, ountries like Frane or the U.S. have bankruptysystems that are soft on debtors (or debtor oriented), limiting reditor's rights,emphasizing the rm's reorganization and taking into aount soial interest. Thetough bankrupty law supports the rights of reditors and makes it easier for themto seize assets of the insolvent rm. As seizing of the assets leads to liquidation ofthe rm, tougher bankrupty law might lead to a higher number of liquidations.The debtor oriented legislative is supported by a view that reditor's behavioran lead to extensive liquidations, hene it may not be soially optimal. The softbankrupty law makes the liquidation less attrative for the reditor and allowsfor reorganization that keeps the ompany in business.
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The optimal bankrupty proedure has been onsidered an important ompo-nent of transition from entrally planned eonomy (Aghion et al., 1992). Tran-sition ountries in Eastern Europe had to set their ompany law system fromsrath. Although they all faed similar starting positions and a similar level ofentral planning, they have hosen signiantly dierent levels of bankrupty law.Some ountries, e.g. the Czeh Republi, adopted a soft bankrupty law, whileother ountries like Hungary or Slovenia adopted relatively tough bankrupty laws(EBRD, 2004).The ontribution of this hapter is an examination of a relationship betweenthe privatization deision and the bankrupty law. We argue that the deisionabout the level of bankrupty law in transition eonomies was inuened by thedierent level of privatization in these ountries. Privatization was one of themain tasks for the governments in the transition from the entral planned eon-omy to the market based eonomy, however ountries dier in the extent of re-forms. Some governments privatized many ompanies in a short period of timeand others opted for a gradual proess, giving the government more ontrol overthe transition. The bankrupty law is an important fator inuening the reditmarket and respetively the entire eonomy. Tough bankrupty law, giving morerights to the reditor, dereases the prie of a redit and improves the inentivesof managers. However, it might lead to a high number of liquidations and thushigh unemployment osts (Berkovith and Israel, 1999). The high level of liquida-tion might not be soially optimal, espeially in times when the eonomy is veryfragile. We argue that if the government has deided for privatization of a largenumber of rms, it might be afraid of a high level of liquidation of many privatizedompanies, and this gives politiians an inentive to soften the bankrupty law.On the ontrary, in ountries that opted for a gradual way of privatization andprivatized a limited number of rms, the share of publi ompanies is large. Asthe government an help these ompanies if they get in eonomi troubles, theyare not threatened by liquidation. The publi rms are then never insolvent and19
therefore they are not threatened by the bankrupty law. When the number ofprivate rms is smaller, the osts of liquidation are smaller and the governmenthooses a tougher bankrupty law improving the inentives of managers in privateompanies.2.1.1 Bankrupty lawsAs we mentioned in the introdution, it is important to distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post eets of bankrupty law. A soft law allows for restruturinga ompany, taking into aount soial osts of liquidation of a bankrupt rm.Softness of the law an be seen, for example, in a disretion spae that is givento a judge deiding about the liquidation of the ompany. The softer the law, themore disretion the judge an use and the more rms will be reorganized and keptin business and not shut down.Giving reditors full ontrol does not ensure that the soially optimal solutionwill be implemented. Creditors might not internalize all the eets of their de-isions. The most ommon example are the soial osts of unemployment. Onthe one hand, it might be optimal for reditors to liquidate the bankrupt om-pany ausing unemployment osts, while on the other hand, it would be soiallyoptimal to keep the old management in power to reorganize the ompany andlimit the unemployment osts. Espeially in the ase of transition eonomies theunemployment osts might be exessive and atually anelling a part of the debtand keeping the management in power might be soially optimal. Thus, the softlaw an implement the ex-post soially optimal solution.The ex-ante eieny point of view fouses on the inuene of the bankruptylaw on the behavior of reditors and debtors before the redit is provided. If thebankrupty law is soft, giving the reditors less rights, the reditors will rise theost of redit to ensure the same expeted payo. This might result in reditrationing. Moreover, weak bankrupty law inuenes the eort exerted by the20
manager in a negative way. If the manager knows that the ompany will notbe liquidated but rather reorganized and he keeps the job, he might exert lessmanagerial eort and therefore worsen the eonomi outome of the rm.Why do some ountries prefer a tough and some a soft bankrupty law? One ofthe possible explanations is presented in La Porta et al. (1997). The authors ndthat the level of reditor's protetion depends on the legal origin in the ountries.Countries with legal system roots in German and ommon law legal system presenta relatively better protetion of reditors than a Frenh ivil law.However, we an argue that the legal systems in transition ountries are similarand we fous in our model on a more politial explanation of the emergene of legaldierenes in the bankrupty law. Biais and Raasens (2000) in their model showthat if the soiety is more onerned about the soial osts, it prefers the soft lawover the tough one. The tough law is preferred when the redit rationing is moreimportant and soial osts are limited. Authors have built a general equilibriummodel with the labor and redit market, explaining dierent bankrupty law levelsby the dierent distribution of wealth in the soiety. Countries where the pivotalvoters are middle lass itizens prefer tough law, as these itizens an benet fromenhaned entrepreneurial opportunities. In the soieties where the majority of thevoters are rather poor, so that they are redit rationed even under the tough law,soft law is preferred.Biais and Mariotti (2003) have built a model based on Holmstrom and Ti-role (1997) orporate nane model. The results are quite similar to Biais andRaasens (2000), however, the major ontribution of this paper is inorporatingorrupt judges. A paper of Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2000) studying the proessin Russia also onsiders the eet of orrupt judges. Both studies ome to thesame onlusions. In a ountry where the judges are orrupted, tough bankruptylaw should be adopted. The orrupt judges use their disretionary power ratherto obtain bribes than to internalize soial osts of liquidation and maximize soialwelfare, and this leads only to more redit rationing.21
2.1.2 PrivatizationIn our analysis, we study the deision about the optimal bankrupty law in theontext of privatization in transition ountries. The problem of privatization hasbeen muh studied in the eonomi literature. The famous Williamson puzzle(Williamson, 1985) asks why the privatized rm should perform better than theprivate one as the government an always hire a manager under the same ontratas the private owner. Sappington and Stiglitz (1988) argue that a privatized rmshould always be at least as eient as a publi ompany. They suggest an aution,where the government sells the ompany and the owner of the privatized rmobtains the exat soial value of the rm. The government an ahieve eientalloation even though it does not know the ost funtion. The new owner hoosesthe optimum prodution level and also internalizes the soial value of the rm inits valuation.Due to these arguments; it is not obvious why governments opt for privati-zation. One of the onepts that answers this problem omes from an inom-plete ontrat approah (Shmidt (1996a), Laont and Tirole (1991), Shmidtand Shnitzer (1993), Shmidt (1996b)). The inomplete ontrat approah em-phasizes that it is not possible to write a omplete ontingent ontrat. Theinomplete ontrat then reates osts due to the asymmetri information be-tween the government and the private owner or manager. Shmidt (1996a) arguesthat by implementing privatization, the government ommits itself to harden thebudget onstraint of a manager (rm) and this fores the manager to improve theprodutive eieny. In ase of nationalization (the opposite of privatization), thegovernment annot ommit not to distort the prodution level in a publi rm andthis results in a soft-budget onstraint for the manager in a publi rm. Due to thesoft-budget onstraint, inentives of the manager to exert eort (to investment inost redution) are distorted.1 However, implementing privatization brings some1The problem of hardening the budget onstraint in transition ountries is disussed in detailby Kornai (2001). 22
osts. The manager of a privatized ompany does not internalize all the osts andhooses the prodution level that is not soially optimal. Börner (2004) studieshow the government's deision about privatization is inuened by the govern-ment onerns about unemployment. The government in our model an use thebankrupty law to soften the hard budget onstraint imposed by privatization. Itannot ommit not to distort the prodution level. Following the bankrupty law,only some ompanies will not be liquidated, beause the liquidation deision is tobe done by independent ourts.Another strand of literature fouses on the ageny problem of politiians ratherthan the ageny problem of managers. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Boykoet al. (1996) argue that it may be politially less ostly to inuene the employmentlevel in a publi ompany than to subsidize a private rm. The publi (voters) maynot be aware of the potential prots that the publi rm is wasting on an ineientemployment level but they realized when the government would like to subsidizea private rm from tax revenues. There privatization solves the politiians agenyproblem and enhanes eieny.2.2 ModelWe understand bankrupty law as a law that desribes rules to liquidate a om-pany if this ompany is insolvent. Bankrupty law an be tough or soft. Underthe tough bankrupty law, all ompanies that are insolvent will be liquidated andthe reditor will get the liquidation value. Under soft insolveny law, however,not all insolvent ompanies will be liquidated. Soft law is understood as a lawthat protets the debtor more than the reditor. In our model, we will denote thetoughness (or stritness) of the law by a one-dimensional variable α, α ∈ (0, 1),
α = 0 means a soft law (rms not liquidated even when they are in loss), α = 1indiates a tough law. The variable α then denotes the atual liquidation rate ofinsolvent rms. This simple approah to bankrupty law is motivated by Biais23
and Mariotti (2003).2The idea of our model is the following. The government hooses the toughnessof the bankrupty law. Then, there is a ontinuum of rms on the interval [0, 1],with share of y private ompanies and (1− y) publi ompanies. We onsider theprivatization deision, i.e. the value of y, as exogenously given. In the privaterm, there is a risk-neutral entrepreneur maximizing his prot; in the state-ownedompany, the government hires a manager.The basi model of the redit market is inspired by Holmstrom and Tirole(1997). We extend the analysis by modelling the bankrupty law and introduingthe problem of privatization by adding the publi rms to the model. All ompa-nies have an investment opportunity. All the projets are idential. The projetyields a return R or 0, investment osts are c. The entrepreneur and the managerin the publi rm respetively, exert eort and inuene the probability of suessof the projet, suering the disutility e. If the entrepreneur (or manager) exertseort, then the projet will yield R with a probability ph or bring 0 with a proba-bility (1− ph). If the entrepreneur does not exert eort, the projet yields R withprobability pl and fails with probability 1− pl, where pl < ph. The entrepreneur's(manager's) eort e an be understood also as an investment in ost redution.The ruial assumption is that the eort e is not observable and annot be on-trated upon, whih results in a moral hazard problem between the bank and theentrepreneur. To undertake the projet, the rm needs to raise outside funds toover the whole investment osts c. The interest rate, for simpliity, is set to 0.The rm gets a redit of an amount c from the bank. We assume a perfetlyompetitive redit market.2The toughness of bankrupty law an be understood as a disretion given to a judge. If ajudge has a lot of disretion in his deision, he an deide not to liquidate a ompany, even ifit is insolvent, for example taking into aount high soial osts of liquidation. Bankrupty lawgiving a lot of disretion to a judge is then onsidered to be soft. The liquidation rate under softbankrupty law is lower also beause soft bankrupty law inreases the osts of the liquidationproedure for reditors. If, for example, the bankrupty proedure an start only with more thanone reditor, this imposes additional osts on the reditor to searh other reditors. If searhingosts are high enough, it does not pay o the reditor to start the liquidation proedure.24
In the rst period, the government takes a deision about the toughness ofthe bankrupty law maximizing the soial welfare. The soial welfare onsistsof the welfare of the entrepreneurs, managers, banks and soial osts aused byrms, that have been shut down. We assume that, if the rm is liquidated, thisleads to soial osts orresponding to the destrution of spei human apital,rm spei investments and also the unemployment osts of the laid-o workers.Espeially the unemployment osts might be substantial (Tirole, 2001).In the seond period, the entrepreneur exerts eort. In the third period,returns are realized and the rm has to pay bak the prie of the redit T tothe bank. At the end of the game, it an pay bak T only if the projet issuessful. If the projet is not suessful, the rm does not have any money andit annot pay bak the redit. Then, the reditor (bank) an start a liquidationproedure. If the rm is liquidated, the bank gets the liquidation value L. Theliquidation value is assumed to be smaller than the ost of the projet c.Whenever the ompany is not liquidated, managers obtain a non-transferablebenet B. This B might represent the satisfation of an entrepreneur or a man-ager, benets of a manager from being a CEO in the ompany, or any other kindof benets the manager (or entrepreneur) earns from staying in power.In the private rm the entrepreneur gets with probability pi, i = h, l, return
R and private benet B and has to pay bak the redit prie T . With probability
1 − pi, i = h, l, the projet does not bring any revenue, but the ompany isliquidated only with probability α. Thus, the entrepreneur gets this private benet
B not only when the projet is suessful, but also in the ase when the projetis not suessful but the rm is not liquidated. This happens with probability
α(1 − pi); i = h, l (2.1)In the ase of the publi rm, we assume that the government never liquidatesa publi rm, i.e. the osts of liquidation (unemployment osts) are larger than25
the osts of ineient prodution plR − c > U . This ruial assumption is basedon the idea that the unemployment osts aused by losing down a rm are muhhigher than simply repaying the debt of the ompany. If the ompany suersa loss, then the government annot ommit not to help this rm and prefers tosubsidize the ompany rather than letting the rm go bankrupt.The government subsidy to a private rm is onsidered to be more ostlyfor the government than the subsidy to a publi rm (Boyko et al., 1996). Inour model we do not allow the government to subsidize the private ompany. Thegovernment ommits not to interfere with the private rm's employment deisions(Börner, 2004). In the ase of the private ompany, the entrepreneur does notinternalize the unemployment osts aused by the liquidation of the ompany.These are the osts of privatization, beause the government annot subsidize theprivate rm. The government an nevertheless still subsidize the publily ownedompany. Justiation for this assumption an be found in the argument that theosts of subsidizing private ompanies are muh higher than subsidizing a publiompany. It might also be diult for politiians explaining to the voters whythey help owners of the private ompany.If we onsider a publi ompany, there is no entrepreneur anymore. The gov-ernment hires a manager instead. The manager obtains wage w in both statesof the world. And he gets the private benet from being manager B when therm is not liquidated. A type of ontrat, where the manager gets a xed wagein both states of the world, is learly a simpliation and the government ouldintrodue a wage sheme, where the payment depends on whih state of the worldis realized. Nevertheless, the manager's inentives to exert eort will always besmaller than the inentives of the entrepreneur in the private ompany, beausein the publi ompany the government annot ommit (in our setting) not to helpthe rm in the bad state of the rm. Thus, we believe this simpliation does nothange our qualitative results and just makes the dierene between the publiand the private rm more obvious. 26
The government also annot threaten the manager to re him, beause it isassumed that all managers are idential. The newly hired manager would havethe same inentive as the previous one. If there are just minimal searhing ostsfor a new manager, it is never optimal to hange the manager (Shmidt, 1996b).The game is solved by bakward indution. First, we determine the optimaleort ondition for a publi and private rm that depends on the level of thetoughness of the bankrupty law. Then, we onsider the government's deisionabout the optimal level of the toughness of the bankrupty law α, depending onthe number of publi and private rms in the eonomy.The timing of the game is summarized in Figure 2.1
Date 0Government hoosesthe bankrupty law Date 1Firm asks fora redit at a bank Date 2Firm exerts eort Date 3Payos are realizedFigure 2.1: TimingWe analyze two senarios with dierent speiation of unemployment osts.In the rst senario, we assume the unemployment osts produed by liquidation ofa single rm are inreasing in the privatization level. The seond senario assumesunemployment osts independent on the privatization level but onsiders new andold rms in the eonomy. The reasoning for these two senarios is the following.If we onsider unemployment osts independent on the privatization level, theprivatization level does not inuene the government's deision to adopt a softor tough bankrupty law. An inrease in the number of private rms inreasesthe produtive eieny and the liquidation osts in the same proportion. If weonsider unemployment osts inreasing in the level of privatization, this is goingto hange. Also, if we take into aount existene of old and new private rms27
in the eonomy, the privatization level inuenes the government's hoie of theoptimal bankrupty law.2.3 Senario 1: Unemployment osts dependingon the privatization levelThe unemployment osts might be onsidered not only as diret osts of unem-ployment benets, that the government has to pay to dismissed workers, but alsoas soial osts that are produed by the shut-down of the rm. If a small rm isliquidated, it does not inuene the life in a town as muh as when a big plantin a small town is liquidated. If a big plant is liquidated, it does not mean onlythousands of workers laid-o, but also might lead to a radial hange of life in asmall town. People have to move to nd a job and this produes additional ostsof unemployment. Suh a situation, we observe in some regions, with a strongmining industry, where unemployment reahed a ertain level and loked theseregions in an unemployment trap. The other reason an be found in the tradearrears.3 Beause of trade arrears, the bankrupty of one rm might inuene liq-uidation of another rm. Hene the unemployment aused by liquidation of onerm might through the trade arrears inuene further inrease of unemploymentdue to the liquidation of other rms. Some reent studies show that orporatebankrupties are orrelated (Das et al., 2006).The higher the portion of bankrupt ompanies, the faster the unemploymentosts grow. This assumption seems to be reasonable in transition ountries, whihfaed system hange and the unemployment osts were not just the unemploymentbenets, but the threat of ollapse of the entire new system. Unemployment ostsour only if the ompany is liquidated. The unemployment osts depend on the3Trade arrears arise when a ompany beome insolvent and annot pay their suppliers. Tradearrears were ommon in transition ountries at the beginning of transition. (Berglöf and Roland,1998). 28
number of unemployed N . The higher is the number of unemployed, the higher arethe unemployment osts. As the number of unemployed atually depends on thenumber of liquidated private rms (publi rms are not liquidated and thereforedo not produe any unemployment), we an write the unemployment osts as afuntion of number of unemployed and this as a funtion of y: U [N(y)] = U [y], thetotal unemployment osts are y(1 − p)aU [y]) and the funtion of unemploymentosts is inreasing in y, i.e. U ′[y] > 0.2.3.1 Optimal eort - private rmWe start our analysis determining the optimal eort ondition for the private rm.High eort aseThe payo of the entrepreneur (owner of the private rm) if he exerts eort is:
Πe,h = ph(R + B − T ) + (1 − ph)(1 − α)B − e (2.2)If he does not exert eort, his payo is:
Πe,l = pl(R + B − T ) + (1 − pl)(1 − α)B (2.3)Obviously, the entrepreneur hooses the high eort, if his payo is higher thanin the other ase, i.e. his inentive ompatibility onstraint is:
ph(R + B − T ) + (1− ph)(1−α)B − e ≥ pl(R + B − T ) + (1− pl)(1−α)B (2.4)The hoie of the entrepreneur depends on the prie of the redit T . We an
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rearrange the inentive ompatibility onstraint.
T ≤ R + αB −
e
ph − pl
(2.5)If the prie of the redit is too high, it does not pay o for the entrepreneurto exert eort. The partiipation of the bank granting the redit is then:
phT + (1 − ph)αL ≥ c
T ≥
c − (1 − ph)αL
ph
(2.6)It is lear that for the bank, the prie has to be large enough, to generate atleast zero prot. Thus, the prie of the redit has to be high enough to fulllthe inentive onstraint of the manager and has to be low enough to fulll thepartiipation onstraint of the reditor. Both onstraints hold if the inequality(2.7) is satised.
R + αB −
e
ph − pl
−
c − (1 − ph)αL
ph
≥ 0 (2.7)Expression (2.7) is inreasing in α, i.e. the higher is α the higher is theprobability that the rm gets the redit and will hoose to exert eort. We annd the minimal αH , suh that for all α ≥ αH , the expression (2.7) being positive.
α ≥ αH =
c(ph − pl) + ph(e − R(ph − pl))
(ph − pl)(phB + (1 − ph)L)
(2.8)However, if the α is too small suh that the expression (2.8) is negative (α <
αH), then the heapest redit the bank an oer is too expensive for the rmtaking into aount its inentive onstraint. We have shown that for α > αH thehigh eort is implemented, for α < αH , no eort is exerted. This leads to thefollowing lemma. 30
Lemma 2.1. The eort hosen by the manager is non-dereasing in the toughnessof the bankrupty law α.Lemma 2.2. The minimum level of the bankrupty law αH that implements thehigh eort is lower
• the higher is the probability of suess ph
• the higher is the private benet B
• the higher is the liquidation value L
• the lower is the ost of the projet c
• the higher is the return of the projet R.Proof. See AppendixAs ph > pl, the higher is the return of the projet, the easier it is to enouragehigh eort. The same holds for the privative benets, beause in the ase when theprojet was unsuessful, the entrepreneur gets only (1 − a)B and this is smalleror equal to B what he gets in the ase of suess of the projet. If L is larger or csmaller, the bank will be satised with a lower prie of the redit T and this givesadditional inentives to the entrepreneur to try harder.No eort aseIn the ase, where α is too small to implement high eort, low eort is stillimplementable. The bank's partiipation onstraint is
T ≥
c − (1 − pl)αL
pl
(2.9)The partiipation onstraint of the entrepreneur is then
pl(R + B − T ) + (1 − pl)(1 − α)B ≥ 0 (2.10)31
If both partiipation onstraints are fullled and insolveny law α is smaller than
αH , no eort is exerted and the redit is granted. If both partiipation onstraints(2.9) and (2.10) annot be fullled, no redit is granted and no projet is realized.2.3.2 Optimal eort - publi rmIn the ase of the publi rm, the government hires a manager. A hired managerknows, that this rm will never be liquidated. He knows, he always gets the xedwage w and the private benet B. Manager's payo is then:
Πm = piB + (1 − pi)B + w − e , i=h,l (2.11)
= B + w − e (2.12)It is lear that the manager will hoose the smallest eort e = 0. As we assumeompetitive markets for idential managers, the wage w oered to a manager issuh that the expeted utility equals the manager's reservation utility U . Weassume that the publi rm is never liquidated, therefore it always gets a redit.2.3.3 Optimal bankrupty lawThe government takes the deision about the toughness of the bankrupty lawmaximizing the soial welfare. The soial welfare onsists of the welfare of en-trepreneurs, managers, banks and soial osts aused by rms, that will be shutdown. The government's objetive funtion for high and low eort is :
Gi(α) = y[piR − (1 − pi)α(U [y] − L)] + (1 − y)plR − c, i = h, l (2.13)The portion of y private ompanies yields R with probability pi. Publi ompaniesget R with probability pl. The private benet of the manager B is not inludedin the soial welfare and the payment of T anels out. In the ase of liquidation32
the unemployment osts U [y] arise and the reditor obtains the liquidation value
L. The aim of our analysis is to determine the optimal hoie of the bankruptylaw α, given the level of privatization y.Proposition 2.1. The optimal level of the toughness of the bankrupty law α isnon-inreasing in the privatization level y.Proof. See AppendixThe optimal bankrupty law is non-inreasing in the level of privatization.Thus, ountries with higher level of privatization are more likely to opt for asofter bankrupty law. The private ompany an potentially go bankrupt. Theprobability that the private rm is liquidated depends on the toughness of thebankrupty law α and on the probability of suess of the projet ph (pl), whih,among others, is also inuened by the toughness of bankrupty law via the eeton the entrepreneur's eort. If privatization is not extensive, tough law positivelyeets high eort and, due to the low number of private rms, the potential ostsaused by ineient liquidation under tough law are limited. Therefore, the gov-ernment prefers tough law when the privatization level is low. As privatizationinreases, the potential osts of liquidation beome high under a tough law andare not outweighed by an inrease in protability of private rms via higher en-trepreneur's eort. The example of the government's payo funtion is illustratedin Figure 2.2. The gure depits the government's payo for α = 0 and the gov-ernment's payos in the point of the tough bankrupty law (α = αH) for threedierent unemployment ost levels; low, medium and high. If the unemploymentosts are relatively low then the government prefers the tough bankrupty law(α = αH) to the soft law (α = 0) for all levels of privatization. If the unemploy-ment osts are relatively high, then the government prefers the soft bankruptylaw to tough soft law for all levels of privatization. In the last ase of medium un-employment osts the government prefers the tough bankrupty law for low levelsof privatization and prefers soft bankrupty law for high levels of privatization.33
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Figure 2.2: The government's payo; R = 5; ph = 2/3; pl = 1/3; B = 4; L =
3.5; c = 4; e = 1; high: U [y] = 20 · y + 11; low: U [y] = 9 · y; medium U [y] = 20 · yIn all publi ompanies, managers know that the government will always granta subsidy in the bad state of the world and therefore they are not investing in ostredution (not exerting eort). Entrepreneurs in private rms know that there isno subsidy from the government in the bad state of the world and this enouragesthem to try hard. Nevertheless, private ompanies might be unsuessful (with asmaller probability than the publi ones), they will be liquidated and this wouldause the unemployment osts. The impat of liquidation an be mitigated by asofter bankrupty law. Soft bankrupty law in this ontext means that not allinsolvent ompanies will be liquidated.On the one hand, government in a ountry with a large share of private prop-erty has an inentive to derease the stritness of bankrupty law, beause a largeshare of privately owned rms may lead to exessively high osts of unemployment.On the other hand, a ountry with a high portion of state owned (ontrolled) prop-erty an aord tough bankrupty laws, beause the osts of unemployment arelimited and might be outweighed by the eieny benets, as the tougher lawreates more inentives to exert eort by the entrepreneur.Proposition 2.2. The tough bankrupty law is more likely to be implemented thelower are the unemployment osts U . 34
Proof. See AppendixIf unemployment osts U are small, the government does not have to protetthe rms so muh by a soft bankrupty law as the liquidation osts are lower andit an implement a tougher bankrupty proedure.The result of our analysis depends on the ruial assumption about unit un-employment osts related to the the levels of unemployment. If we onsider theunemployment osts unrelated to the privatization level, then the government'spayo in the point α = 0 is either larger or smaller than the payo in the point
α = αH for all y. In other words, either only tough bankrupty law or only softbankrupty law is preferred for all levels of privatization, and this ase does notbring any interesting insight.In the publily held ompanies, the manager knows that if it is not soiallyoptimal, the government will never liquidate a publi rm and will rather subsi-dize the unsuessful rm. We onsider the ase, when a liquidation of a publilyowned ompany is never soially optimal and subsidies are allowed only for pub-lily owned rms. We assume that the subsidy to the private rm is assoiatedwith additional prohibitive osts and is not possible. The bankrupty law, then,does not inuene manager's eort in a state owned enterprize (SOE). Privaterms are more eient in the prodution, beause the owners are exerting moreeort than the managers in SOE. Private rms, though, in ontrast to publirms, might go bankrupt. If a transition ountry has deided to privatize alarge share of its eonomy, then there are potential high osts of unemployment.Therefore, suh a ountry might prefer the soft law, diminishing the eet of anineient liquidation. If the number of privatized rms is relatively small, thenthe osts of unemployment are limited and the ountry might prefer the toughbankrupty law enouraging high eorts exerted by the entrepreneurs in privaterms. Governments have in bankrupty law another tool to orret for extremeosts of ineient liquidation by private rms, i.e. to derease the osts produed35
by privatization.2.4 Senario 2: Old versus new rms in transitionountriesIn this setion, we onsider the seond senario of our model. The speiationof the model remains the same as in the previous setion, exept the assumptionof unemployment osts linearly inreasing in the privatization level and introdu-tion of old and new rms in the eonomy. We assume that the unemploymentosts are linear in the level of privatization, i.e. unit unemployment osts areonstant for all y and total unemployment osts inrease linearly with numberof unemployed workers. We also introdue a distintion between old state rmsand newly established enterprizes in transition eonomies. The share of old rmsin the eonomy is x, the share of new rms is 1 − x. The old rms are at thebeginning in all transition ountries publily owned and the privatization deisionis made about these rms. There are also new rms in the eonomy. These rmsare all privately owned. The new rms have the same harateristis as the oldones, the only dierene is that the probability of suess in these rms whenthe entrepreneur exerts high eort qh is higher than probability of suess in oldrms (ph). The probability of suess if no eort is exerted is the same for oldand new rms (ql = pl). The motivation behind this assumption is the fat thatthe publily owned ompanies had usually very ineient prodution proesses,a soialisti struture of orporate governane, the prodution was determinedby a entral plan and therefore managers had less possibilities to inuene theoutome with their eort. These rms also had large number of employees andwere therefore very diult to reorganize. After the privatization deision on oldrms is done, the government sets the bankrupty law. Then, the game proeedsas in the previous setion; rms ask for a redit in a bank, hoose their eort leveland in the last period, payos are realized.36
The optimization problem of the entrepreneurs in the new rms is the sameas in the old rms. However, the probability of suess is larger and thereforethe level of bankrupty law that implements high eort is smaller for new rms.As these rms are more protable, they are ready to aept a higher prie of theredit due to the softer bankrupty law and still hoose the high eort. The protof a new rm ΠN in ase of high and low eort an be written as:
ΠNH = qh(R + B − T ) + (1 − qh)B(1 − α) − e (2.14)
ΠNL = ql(R + B − T ) + (1 − ql)B(1 − α) (2.15)The partiipation onstraint of the bank is:
T ≥
c − (1 − qh)αL
qhAgain, to implement high eort, the inentive onstraint and the bank's partii-pation onstraint have to be fullled together. The onstraints are fullled if:
α ≥ αN =
c(qh − pl) + qh[e − R(qh − ql)]
(qh − ql)(qhB + (1 − qh)L)
(2.16)We have shown in Lemma 2.2 that minimal αH is dereasing in ph and therefore,
αN is learly smaller than the minimal bankrupty law level by old rms, αH .The government's payo depends on the level of the bankrupty law. First,the bankrupty law diretly inuenes the liquidation rate of rms that are unsu-essful. Seond, it inuenes the inentives of managers and the eort they exert.It is lear that we have to onsider only three levels of the bankrupty law, i.e.
α = 0, α = αN and α = αH . Any level in between is learly not optimal, beauseit does not eet inentives and only inreases the osts due to the larger liqui-dation rate. If we assume that high eort is not optimal for α = 0, i.e. αN > 0,
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then the payo of the government is:
Gα=0 = x[yplR + (1 − y)plR] + (1 − x)qlR (2.17)
Gα=αN = x[y(plR + (1 − pl)[−αN(U − L)] + (1 − y)plR)]
+ (1 − x)[qhR + (1 − qh)[−αN(U − L)]] (2.18)
Gα=αH = x[y(phR + (1 − ph)[−αH(U − L)] + (1 − y)plR)]
+ (1 − x)[qhR + (1 − qh)[−αH(U − L)]] (2.19)The payo in the point α = 0 is onstant for all levels of privatization. Thegovernment's payo in ases when α = αN and α = αH is dereasing in y.So far, we have just assumed that the probability of suess is larger in thenew rms than in the old rms. Now, we make an additional assumption aboutthe amount of this dierene. We assume that the new rms are so protablethat the tough law for this rms is soially optimal. If the new rms have goodprodutivity, then the possibility of liquidation is low, and government does nothave to be afraid of unemployment osts even under the tough law. On the otherhand, the tough law enourages managers as it dereases the payo in the ase ofa failure. In this ase, our assumption is that the produtivity of the new rms isso high that motivating the managers to exert high eort is more protable thanthe osts aused by a higher liquidation rate (2.20):
qhR − (1 − qh)αN(U − L) > qlR (2.20)On the other hand, we assume that the produtivity in the old rms is so low, thatthe soial value of the old rms under the tough law that enourages managers tohoose high eort is smaller than the value under the soft law α (2.21).
phR − (1 − ph)αH(U − L) < plR − (1 − pl)αN(U − L) (2.21)As the left hand side is stritly inreasing and ontinuous in ph, there exists px38
suh that for ph < px assumption (2.21) holds. In other words, this assumptionsays that enouraging high eort in the old rms is too expensive and it is moreprotable to implement softer law and aept low eort in these rms. It followsthat the bankrupty law αH annot be optimal. For the new rms αN is enoughto enourage high eort, any higher level of α just inreases the osts of unem-ployment. Then we have to ompare only the bankrupty law levels α = 0 and
α = αN .First, we onsider the point where there is no privatization (y = 0) and in theeonomy there are only publily owned old rms and private new rms. Givenour assumption (2.20), in point y = 0, G(α = αN) > G(α = 0).Now we ompare the government's payos G(α = αN) and G(α = 0) for alllevels of privatization y.
Gα=αN − Gα=0 = x[plR − y(1 − pl)αN(U − L)]
+ (1 − x)[qhR − (1 − qh)αN(U − L)] − xplR + (1 − x)qlR
= (1 − x)[(qh − ql)R − (1 − qh)αN(U − L)]
− xy(1 − pl)αN(U − L) (2.22)The payo G(α = αN) is dereasing in y. Therefore, we an nd yx, suh that
yx =
(1 − x)((qh − ql)R − (1 − qh)αN(U − L))
(1 − pl)αNx(U − L)
(2.23)
y < yx : G(α = αN) > G(α = 0)
y > yx : G(α = αN) < G(α = 0)The analysis an be summarized in the following proposition.Proposition 2.3. If the probability of suess by old rms is smaller than px,then for privatization level y > yx soft bankrupty law α = 0 is preferred and for
y < yx tougher bankrupty law α = αN is preferred.39
We obtain a similar result as in the previous senario, if the privatization levelis below some threshold, the government prefers tough law, if the privatizationis larger, the government opts for soft bankrupty law. The example is shownin Figure 2.3. The gure depits the government's payo for tough (α = αN)and soft (α = 0) bankrupty law. We an see that the government prefers thetough bankrupty for low levels of privatization and the soft law for high levels ofprivatization. We an also show that the optimal poliy depends on the share ofnew ompanies in the eonomy.
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Figure 2.3: Government payo, x = 0.9; R = 5; U = 5; ph = 2/3; qh = 3/4; pl =
ql = 1/3; B = 4; L = 3.5; c = 4; e = 1Proposition 2.4. The tougher bankrupty law is preferred:
• the higher is the probability of suess qh,
• the lower is the probability ql(= pl),
• the lower are the unemployment osts U ,
• the higher is the return of the projet R,
• the higher is the liquidation value L,
• and the lower is the share of old enterprizes x.
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Proof. The higher is the yx the more probable is, given the level of privatization,implementation of the tougher bankrupty law αN rather than the soft bank-rupty law α = 0. Keeping in mind that αN is dereasing in qh, dereasing in R,inreasing in ql and dereasing in private benet B and liquidation value L, wean immediately prove this proposition from partial derivation of yx with respetto a orresponding variable.The tough bankrupty law inuenes positively from the soial point of viewonly the new enterprises, it enourages the entrepreneur to exert more eort anddereases the prie of redit for him. As new enterprises are less likely to beunsuessful, they produe lower osts of unemployment than the old rms. It islear that if there are more new rms in the eonomy beneting from the toughlaw, tougher bankrupty law is more likely to be adopted. If the share of theprivatized rms is relatively small or the share of the new enterprises is relativelylarge, then it is protable to enourage high eort in the new rms beause theosts by old enterprises due to the higher level of liquidation rate are outweighedby the gains in produtivity by new rms. However, if the share of privatized rmsis large and the share of old rms is large, then implementing tough law wouldause large unemployment osts, and then soft bankrupty law is preferred. If theprotability of old rms is low enough (ph < px) it is never protable to enouragehigh eort in old privatized rms.If the probability of suess of old rms rises suiently with higher eort(ph > px), then also for old privatized rms, implementing tough bankruptylaw indues high eort whih is protable, beause the gains from high eortare larger than alternative unemployment osts in ase of failure. In this ase,the option with tough law αH implementing high eort in old rms dominatesthe option of bankrupty law αN only if the share of the old rms is not largeenough. Implementing αH inreases the soial osts by new rms (it is higherthan αN). If the share of new rms is large, then the osts of implementation
αH (unemployment osts by new rms) might be larger than the gains (higher41
protability of old privatized rms).2.5 Example ases: Czeh Republi and HungaryWe have shown that the the optimal level of the bankrupty law dereases with theshare of private property. If we assume the privatization deision as given, thenwe are able to explain dierenes between transition ountries in the toughnessof their bankrupty law. The Czeh Republi is a prime example of very fastprivatization using the method of mass privatization. In ontrast, Hungary hashosen relatively slower way of privatization via diret sales. At the same time,the Czeh Republi adopted a very soft bankrupty law, in the early stage oftransition even introduing a protetion period, when rms were not in fat ableto be liquidated (Diblík, 2004). On the other hand, Hungary implemented in 1991an extremely tough bankrupty law with an automati trigger, when the managersof rms that held overdue debts of any size to any reditor were required to initiatebankrupty proedure (Bonin and Shaer (1999), Janda (2004)). This law wassoftened in 1993. We an observe many dierenes in the bankrupty law designin Hungary and in the Czeh Republi during the 1990's. Aording to Mithell(1998), the bankrupty law in the Czeh Republi imposed high bankrupty ostson reditors, resulting in a lower number of bankrupty lings than in Hungary.Today, the privatization levels in both ountries are very similar. However, thelarge dierene in the level of reditor's protetion in the bankrupty law stillremains, the Czeh Republi bankrupty law is onsidered to be very soft, whileHungarian one belongs to the toughest among transition ountries.The bankrupty law is usually onsidered as a tool against ineient liqui-dation. In this ontext, we an distinguish between an eonomi and nanialdistress. If the rm was unsuessful beause of the eonomi distress, this means,that rm's assets were not used eiently and in this ase, it is better when therm is liquidated and rm's assets are sold. On the other hand, nanial distress42
is usually some kind of external shok inuening the apital struture (Knot andVyhodil, 2004). For example, during the period of nanial risis in Asia, eo-nomially sound rms might beame insolvent as their debts where denominatedin foreign urreny and the loal urreny depreiated. If we look at the situa-tion in transition ountries, privatization plays a ruial role. In these ountries,the situation hanged dramatially and rms might have beome insolvent notneessarily beause of eonomi ineieny but beause of the transition of theeonomy. For example, many rms beame insolvent beause of trade arrears(Berglöf and Roland, 1998). These rms ould not pay their suppliers, beausetheir ustomers did not pay them. This led to an aumulation of arrears andmany suppliers were de fato lending their lients. As the rms were privatelyowned, the government had less opportunity to subsidize these rms and there-fore, privatization might have led to strengthening the problem of trade arrears.This makes the liquidation more likely and inreases the osts of privatization.The soft bankrupty law then redues the problem of ineient liquidation dueto trade arrears.2.5.1 Privatization levelOur analysis is done under the assumption that the privatization level is given.We justify it by the fat that the privatization deision is usually done by onegovernment and it is hard to reverse the deision by the following government.The bankrupty law an relatively easily be hanged within one eletion period. Intransition ountries, the privatization program was prepared by one governmentand was followed also by the next governments. In the ase of bankrupty law,for example, the Czeh Republi has amended the insolveny law thirteen timesbetween 1990-2004 (Diblík, 2004).In addition, there were limited alternatives to privatization deisions. Hungaryat the beginning of the transition period faed a relatively large foreign debt43
(EBRD, 1999) and the privatization deision in Hungary ould have been driven bythis onstraint. Hungary needed ash to repay the debt and hose the privatizationmethod of diret sales, largely to foreign investors. On the other hand, the Czehrepubli put a high emphasis on fast progress of the reforms and hose a method ofmass privatization whih does not generate inome for a government's budget. Theruial dierene is, that diret sales annot be done as fast as mass privatization,as there is a need to nd strategi investors. As Hungary ould not privatize sofast, it hose a relatively low share of publi property in the early stage.The speed of privatization must not neessarily be determined by restrition.Another reason might lie in ideologial bakground. Some ountries have hosengradualisti way of reforms and others have hosen the shok therapy.2.5.2 Initial onditions of reformsInitial onditions of reforms ould also inuene the deision about the bankruptylaw. We have shown in our extension with new and old enterprises that withhigher share of new private rms, tougher law is more likely to be implemented.In Hungary, the reforms of the soialisti system started already in late 1980'sand in time of sudden politial hanges, there were already new private rmsoperating to some extend. First reforms in the Czeh Republi were trigged afterthe break up of ommunist power (Mejstrik, 1996). At the time of implementationof the bankrupty law, the share of new rms was muh larger in Hungary thanin the Czeh Republi. Our model predits, that the Hungarian governmenthad more inentives to implement a tough bankrupty law than the Czeh one.Furthermore, as the private setor of the new rms was already established tosome extent in Hungary, it was more prepared to absorb dismissed people fromstate owned enterprizes losed beause of tough bankrupty law. The number ofprivate rms might therefore inuene also the level of unemployment osts.
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2.5.3 RestruturingCzeh rms were relative less suessful in restruturing than Hungarian rms(Mejstrik, 1996). This dierene might be due to the privatization method, asthey were sold (given for free) mostly to domesti owners, without any initialapital. Lak of apital and know-how makes the probability of failure higheras the rms were less stable in periods of nanial distress. On the other hand,Hungary privatized their rms often to foreign owners (EBRD, 1999). Theseowners ould help the ompany to invest into new tehnologies, brought moreeetive orporate governane and helped the rm in times of nanial problems.The bankrupty law aets an entrepreneur's eort and this an be interpretedalso as restruturing inentives. This might have led to very poor restruturing inthe Czeh Republi, the rms were privatized, but the owners had less inentivesunder the weak bankrupty law to restruture the ompany than owners underthe tough law. This ould ause the inrease in produtivity in Hungary leadinginto high privatization level in Hungary in the next period. The osts of unem-ployment are large at the beginning and under suessful privatization, the ostsderease in time - with restruturing. In the Czeh Republi instead, less restru-turing took plae leading to a slower derease in unemployment osts (EBRD,1999). Therefore, the Czeh Republi still opts for the soft law, while Hungary'sprivatization to foreign investors has improved this ondition and Hungary prefersnow a tough law, even with relatively high portion of private property.2.5.4 Developed ountries vs. transition ountriesDeveloped ountries have relatively tougher bankrupty laws in omparison totransition ountries (Pistor et al., 2000). This might be explained by a higherprodutivity of rms and quality of institutions that are usually better in matureeonomies. We an also understand improved institutions, for example, as a betterorporate governane. Better institutions allow a manager to better inuene the45
performane of the rm (Börner, 2004). The institutions might also inuene theliquidation value L that banks reeive in ase of liquidation. The better the lawenforement, the higher is L and the more likely is the high eort implemented.With higher eort implemented the probability of suess is ph and the tougherlaw is more likely. If the probabilities are high enough (ph > px), enouragingeort in publi rms might be protable and the government prefers a toughbankrupty law and this refers to the ase of developed ountries.2.6 Empirial evidene2.6.1 Privatization level in transition ountriesIn this setion we present some empirial evidene, supporting the results of ourmodel. The setion uses ross-setional data from EBRD Transition Report 2004,that is devoted to a problem of insolveny law in transition ountries. The data setis based on a survey, where experts from all ountries evaluated extensiveness andeetiveness of bankrupty law. Extensiveness evaluates, what is the quality ofthe bankrupty law aording to the ode of law, while the eetiveness measures,how the law is in fat implemented and enfored in reality. For our purposes weare going to use aggregate measure of the eetiveness (Effec) of the bankruptylaw in eah ountry ontaining measures for speed, enforement and transparenyof the bankrupty law. The eetiveness of the bankrupty is losely onnetedto the toughness of the law as proedures that are faster, more transparent andless ostly are onsidered to protet the reditor's rights better. We use theeetiveness measure as a proxy for the toughness of the law in our model.Data about privatization are also from EBRD statistis. First, we use theEBRD index of privatization progress for large-sale and small-sale enterprizesthat ranges from 1 to 4, where 1 denotes little, and 4 denotes full privatizationof enterprizes (more than 75% privately-owned apital with eetive management46
ontrol). The data set is from 2003. Seond, we use measures of private setorshare of GDP in 2003. However, this measure does not reet exatly how muhhas the ountry privatized, beause it annot distinguish between privatized SOErms and newly established rms. The basi empirial model might be writtenas:
Effeci = β0 + β1Privatizationi + c · Controlsi + ǫi (2.24)Where Effec denotes eetiveness of bankrupty law, Privatization is a mea-sure of extent of privatization, Contorls is a vetor of ontrol variables and ǫ isan error term. We ran a number of regressions with Effec as the dependentvariable, the results are reported in Table 2.1 in Appendix.Table 2.1: Privatization and the eetiveness of the bankrupty lawVariable OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 OLS 4Interept 87.323*** 78.631*** 95.279** 26.957**(14.441) (10.218) (33.512) (26.124)Privatization progress -4.961* -15.257***(2.512) (3.168)Private share -0.415** -0.538*(0.200) (0.254)GDP 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.0002(0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001)Civil Liberties 4.475* 3.412(2.098) (1.917)Corruption 7.096*** 1.203(2.203) (3.508)Rule of Law 5.329** 7.087**(2.227) (2.433)Inequality 51.485* 76.803**(26.553) (29.532)
R2 0.149 0.169 0.772 0.529F statistis 1.95 2.17 23.87 2.14Number of observations 24 24 18 18Robust standard error in parentheses* signiant at 10%; ** signiant at 5%; *** signiant at 1%The oeient measuring the progress of privatization is negative and signi-47
ant at the 10% signiane level in the speiation using only GDP as a ontrolvariable. If we use other ontrol variables, the signiane rises to the 1% level.Looking at the measure for the private setor as a proxy for privatization, we seethat this is signiant at the 5%, or 10% level respetively. As a ontrol variableswe have used: index of ivil liberties onstruted by the organization FreedomHouse (www.freedomhouse.org), that measures rights of the itizens to expresstheir views from 1 (free) to 7 (not free), orruption pereption index as a mea-sure of orruption onstruted by Transpareny International ranging between 0(highly orrupt) and 10 (highly lean) and a measure of rule of law aording tothe index of EBRD. As a last ontrol variable we used an inequality measure-ment as a dierene in the Gini index in the ountry between year 1989 and 1999,athing the eet of inrease of inequality in transition ountries. All the ontrolvariables are signiant at least at the 10% signiane level. Higher ivil liberties,lower orruption and better rule of law are positively orrelated with eetivenessof bankrupty law. The inequality variable has an interesting interpretation. Thehigher is the inrease of inequality, the more eetive is the bankrupty law. Thissupports the argument of Biais and Mariotti (2003), that ountries with a largershare of poor people hoose a tougher law, beause under soft law the poor peoplewould be redit rationed from the market.2.6.2 Privatization methodAnother possible approah is to onsider not the level of privatization, but themethod of privatization. The basi idea behind our model is that the governmentloses the power to ontrol employment in privatized rms and therefore mightbe more motivated to adopt a soft bankrupty law. We an then distinguishprivatization methods aording to the fat, how they allow the government toontrol the unemployment level. If the government uses the method of massprivatization, where all property is given to the entire soiety, the government anhardly inuene, who will ontrol this ompany at the end of the privatization48
proess and there is a high risk that this ompany might be shut down by a newowner. If the government uses the method of diret sale, it an be more surethat the ompany will not be liquidated, beause they know to whom they areselling this ompany. With this argumentation, we would expet the governmentthat implements the mass privatization method to adopt rather a soft law andthe government preferring diret sales or management buy-outs should tend moreto a tough law. We onstrut a dummy that equals 1, if the ountry had massprivatization as dominant method and 0 otherwise and regress this variable on theeetiveness of the bankrupty law. The basi empirial model might be writtenas:
Effeci = β0 + β1Methodi + c · Controlsi + ǫi (2.25)
Effec denotes again eetiveness of the bankrupty law, Method is a dummyfor privatization method, Contorls is a vetor of ontrol variables and ǫ is an errorterm. We ran regressions, where Effec is the dependent variable, the results arereported in Table 2.2 in Appendix. Regressions were run again using robusttehniques to orret for heterosedastiity.The oeient of privatization method is negative and signiant at the 10%and 5% signiane level respetively. We used the same ontrol variables as inthe previous example; in this ase, only the oeient of inequality measurementis signiant at the 1 % signiane level. We have shown that in both examplesthat the privatization level and mass privatization, respetively are negativelyorrelated with the eetiveness of the bankrupty law supporting the preditionsof our model.
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Table 2.2: Method of privatization and the eetiveness of the bankrupty lawVariable OLS 1 OLS 2Interept 62.152*** 78.631 ***( 4.255) (10.218)Method -6.969* -13.290**(3.631) (5.857)GDP -0.000 0.000(0.001) (0.001)Civil Liberties 2.878(1.684)Corruption 2.085(2.548)Rule of Law 2.856(2.141)Inequality 91.840***(28.813)
R2 0.139 0.584F statistis 1.89 2.73Number of observations 25 18Robust standard error in parentheses* signiant at 10%; ** signiant at 5%; *** signiant at 1%2.6.3 Extensiveness of the bankrupty lawIf we onsider extensiveness of the bankrupty law instead of the eetiveness,neither privatization level nor privatization method has a signiant inuene onthe extensiveness of bankrupty law. This result is in line with ndings of Pistoret al. (2000) and Pistor (2000) that the quality of ontrat enforement and laweetiveness is muh more important in transition ountries than the law itself.2.7 ConlusionsThe average liquidation of a ompany, aording to the World Bank study from20044, takes 9 years in the Czeh Republi. In Hungary the same proess takes 2years, in Slovenia 3.6 years and in Poland 1.4 year. Explaining the deision about4www.doingbusiness.org 50
the bankrupty law in ontext of the privatization deision may help to understandthe dierenes among transition ountries in Eastern Europe. From our analysiswe an provide a following explanation. If the privatization level is high, leadingto high unemployment osts, the government rather prefers to lower the numberof liquidations via softening the bankrupty law. If the privatization level is low,resulting in lower unemployment osts, it pays o to rather motivate the managerswith a tough bankrupty law and allow for higher level of liquidation.The ountries with a larger share of private new rms at the beginning of thetransition are more likely to adopt a tough bankrupty to enourage entrepreneursin the new rms with more inentives. However, if the privatization level is high,there are many old private rms that are very likely to go bankrupt under thetough bankrupty law produing large osts of unemployment. If the eet ofnew rms is not large enough, the government rather prefers a soft law avoidinga high liquidation rate among old privatized rms. Keeping the old ineientrms under state-ownership allows the government to ontrol the unemploymentin these rms and a tough law is more likely to be implemented.The Czeh government has hosen a very fast way of privatization and then ittried to soften the negative eets of privatization by implementing a soft bank-rupty law limiting the number of liquidations. A seond level of inuene werestate-owned banks that were granting redits without muh emphasis on prof-itability. On the other hand, ountries that proeeded slower in the privatizationproess ould aord more market oriented poliies in other setors, as the threatof liquidation of privatized rms was not so severe. As our empirial evidenesuggests, the privatization hoie is negatively orrelated with a toughness ofbankrupty law in transition ountries.
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2.A AppendixProof of Lemma 2.2Proof. The proof for B, R, L and c follows diretly from the partial derivationsof the expression (2.8). We onsider only the ase, when a > 0, i.e. c(ph − pl) +
ph(e − R(ph − pl)) > 0Considering the inuene of probability of suess ph on the minimal level of
α implementing high eort, the inentive ompatibility onstraint of the entre-preneur and the partiipation onstraint of the bank are fullled if R + αB −
e
ph−pl
−
c−(1−ph)αL
ph
≥ 0. This expression is inreasing and ontinuous in a and onthe interval where ph > pl, it is also stritly inreasing and ontinuous in ph. Thisimplies that αH is dereasing in ph.Proof of Proposition 2.1Proof. To determine the optimal bankrupty law, we an again restrit our atten-tion to two ases - α = 0 and α = αH . If 0 < α < αH it is not high enough toimplement high eort, and beause higher α inreases the osts of unemployment,it is optimal to hoose the lowest level. The same argumentation holds for thease α > αH . Higher α does not inrease the eort exerted, it only inreases theosts of unemployment.If α = 0 then (assuming that αH > 0) no eort is implemented and, inthis ase, the payo of the government is onstant for all levels of privatization
G(α = 0) = plR. As there are no osts of unemployment (α = 0) and neitherpubli nor private rms hoose high eort, the payo is onstant in y.In the ase α = αH , the government's payo an be rearranged:
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GαH = y((ph − pl)R − (1 − ph)αH(U [y] − L)) + plR − c (2.26)Comparing G(α = 0) and G(α = αH), we an write
G(α = αH) − G(α = 0) = y((ph − pl)R − (1 − ph)αH(U [y] − L)) (2.27)If this expression is positive, G(α = αH) is larger and tougher bankruptylaw is preferred. If the expression is negative, then the soft bankrupty law ispreferred. There are three possible ases:1. The unemployment osts are relatively high even for very low privatizationlevels. If U(y = 0) > (ph−pl)R
(1−ph)αH
+ L, then given the fat U ′[y] > 0 expression(2.26) is negative for any y larger and G(α = 0) > G(α = αH). In this asea soft law is preferred for all levels of privatization.2. The unemployment osts are relatively low even for a very high privatizationlevel. If U(y = 1) < (ph−pl)R
(1−ph)αH
+ L, then given the fat U ′[y] > 0 expression(2.26) is positive for any y smaller and G(α = αH < G(α = 0)). In this asea tough law is preferred for all levels of privatization.3. The last ase is when the unemployment osts are relatively small for lowlevels of privatization and beome relatively large in the ase of large pri-vatization level. One the expression (2.27) beomes negative for some y, itstays negative for any larger y. In other words, one is the soft law preferredfor some level of privatization, it is also preferred for any larger y.
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Proof of Proposition 2.2Proof. Proof follows diretly from partial derivation of the expression (2.27) thatompares the government's payo for α = 0 and the government's payo for
α = αH .
∂G(α = αH) − G(α = 0)
∂U
= −(1 − ph)yαH < 0 (2.28)
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Chapter 3
Bankrupty Laws and DebtRenegotiation
3.1 IntrodutionBankrupty laws are reognized as fundamental institutions neessary for growthof redit markets and entrepreneurship (Aghion et al., 1992). They dene therules and proedures under whih a reditor an take possession of entrepreneur'sassets and hene diretly inuene the reditor's inentives to liquidate an insol-vent ompany. Ideally, a bankrupty law should protet reditors, impose nanialdisipline on managers, indue restruturing, and free assets from ineient useLambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2000). However, there is no lear agreement on theoptimal bankrupty law design. Moreover, bankrupty laws dier aross ountriessubstantially along many dimensions suh as alloation of ontrol rights, prior-ity rules or the role of judges and ourts. Not surprisingly, it is unlikely that asingle design of these bankrupty laws ts all possible situations1 and dierent1Hart (2000) notes that It is unlikely that one size ts all... Whih proedure a ountryhooses or should hoose may then depend on the other fators, e.g. the ountry's institutionalstruture or legal tradition. One an also imagine a ountry hoosing a menu of proedures andallowing rms to selet among them. It is important to reognize that bankrupty reform shouldnot be seen in isolation: it may be neessary to ombine it with legal and other reforms, e.g.55
bankrupty law designs have dierent eets on the number of liquidations inthe ountry. Claessens and Klapper (2005) observe dierent eets of the bank-rupty law on the number of liquidations with respet to dierent quality of lawenforement.Given the role of the bankrupty law to protet reditors, we onsider a bank-rupty law to be a one-dimensional variable that inuenes reditor's expetedvalue of assets that an be reovered. High values orrespond to a tough bank-rupty law giving the reditor substantial rights, while low values represent lowprotetion of reditor's rights (Biais and Mariotti, 2003). We analyze the eetof the bankrupty law on the number of liquidations in a simple model of bor-rowing and lending with asymmetri information, where due to the possibility ofrenegotiation the reditor annot redibly ommit to liquidate the debtor if thedefault ours. Our model is based on Bester (1994) and we modify the rene-gotiation stage aording to the soft budget onstraint literature (Berglöf andRoland, 1997). The environment is designed as follows: there is one entrepreneurwho needs to raise apital to nane a risky projet. The projet is naned bya reditor, who annot observe whether the projet was suessful or not. Thebankrupty law allows the reditor to liquidate the debtor's rm (take possessionof debtor's assets) in ase the entrepreneur defaults and does not pay bak thedebt. Without the possibility of liquidation, the entrepreneur does not have anyinentive to pay bak the debt. The model aptures the prinipal-agent problembetween the reditor and the debtor, where both parties have symmetri infor-mation about the ex-ante protability of the projet, but the absene of stateveriation reates the informational asymmetry at the time the projet is real-ized. Due to the fat that the rm an make a renegotiation oer, the reditorannot ommit to liquidate an insolvent rm. If the reditor aepts the oer,the debtor avoids the liquidation and this option soften the debtor's hard budgetonstraint reated by the bankrupty law, as the entrepreneur knows that thethe training of judges, improvements in orporate governane and the strengthening of investorsrights, and possibly even hanges in the international nanial system.56
unsuessful projet may not be liquidated.As in hapter 2, we fous on studying the bankrupty law, onsidering ex-anteand ex-post eets. The analysis of bankrupty law often fouses on the ex-posteets, i.e. how the bankrupty law inuenes the value of an insolvent ompany.However, in our model we onsider ex-ante eets, i.e. the eets on the behaviorof the agents before the bankrupty ours.2There is a growing literature on the optimal bankrupty law. Our paper isrelated to this literature in several ways. Berkovith et al. (1998) onsider theeets of bankrupty law on ex ante deision making taking into aount debtontrat renegotiating. They derive the optimal bankrupty law that implementsex-ante eient solution. They present two restritions on the bargaining gamebetween the laimants that the bankrupty ourt an use to prevent strategidefault by a debtor. However, their model does not onsider the eet of theexistene of soft budget onstraint on the reditor's and debtor's deision makingand the ex-post eets, namely the atual liquidation rates.The bankrupty law inuenes the value of the ollateral for the reditor, there-fore the role of the ollateral is impliitly expressed in the bankrupty law. In thetheoretial literature it was shown that the ollateral is used to solve the problemsresulting from asymmetri information - state veriation (Bester, 1994), moralhazard (Bester, 1985), adverse seletion (Biais and Mariotti, 2003). Bester (1994)investigates how the prospet of debt renegotiation aets both the reditor's andthe debtor's behavior. As in our model, the renegotiation ours beause the2The ex-post eieny requires that the bankrupty law maximizes the value of the insolventrm for all stakeholder. If we onsider the tough bankrupty law giving substantial right toreditors, suh a law does not neessarily maximize the soial welfare. Berkovith and Israel(1999) argue that the managers in the rm might have better information and atually anellinga part of the debt and keeping the management in power might be soially optimal. Biais andMariotti (2003) mentions that the reditor might not internalize all the eet of liquidation, e.g.the unemployment osts that arise due to the rm liquidation. On other hand analyzing theproblem from the ex-ante point of view, soft bankrupty laws inuene the management ationsand this make the ontrating of debt naning in prinipal-agent setting even more severe. Themanagers prot from ontinuation of the projet as they an extrat the residual ash ow andprivate benets. The tough bankrupty law that gives the reditor substantial rights makes theliquidation more protable for reditor thus makes the ontinuation less likely.57
absene of preommitment preludes a redible bankrupty threat. Bester showsthat the problem an be mitigated by ollateralized assets. Although the ollat-eralization inreases the total amount of liquidated assets, it may derease theexpeted dead-weight loss assoiated with asset liquidation. This eet is largerfor low-eient rms and therefore these have more inentives to post ollateralthan high-eient rms. Our setting diers from Bester's in modelling the re-naning stage and we treat the bankrupty law as an endogenous variable. Thebankrupty law in Bester's setting does not aet the number of liquidations asthe reditor has in the renegotiation stage full bargaining power and he an inthe renegotiation always get the value of ollateral. The toughness of bankruptylaw then does not inuene the reditor's deision between liquidation or rene-gotiation. Janda (2004) analyzes a similar setting as Bester (1994) taking intoonsideration asymmetri information between the entrepreneur and the reditorabout the ex-ante quality of the projet. He nds that renegotiation does not pre-lude the use of ollateral as a sreening devie in the presene of adverse seletionproblem.Hainz (2004) studies how the is the number of bankrupties inuened by thequality of institutions in a model of bank-rm relationship. She nds that a bankreeives the payo if a rm is liquidated, but loses the rent from inumbent us-tomers due to its informational advantage. There exists a range where improvinginstitutions may derease the number of liquidations.The soft budget onstraint (SBC) problem relates to the bankrupty law viathe reditor's impossibility to preommit not to renegotiate the ontrat. A softbudget onstraint is dened as a relationship when an organization annot ommitnot to subsidize the organization with a budget onstraint if the laims exeed thebudget onstraint, see (Kornai et al., 2003). In some sense we an regard a reditordeision not to liquidate an insolvent rm as a form of subsidy. Maskin andXu (2001) and Berglöf and Roland (1997) treat SBC as a nanial ommitmentproblem of not imposing bankrupty on the defaulted entrepreneur.58
In our model we nd that there exists an interval in the toughness of thebankrupty law, within whih the law has a negative eet on a liquidation rate,i.e. the probability the rm is liquidated dereases with the toughness of thebankrupty law. In addition, we analyze the eet of the bankrupty law on theliquidation rate for dierent levels of ompetition. We nd a higher liquidationrate in less ompetitive redit markets. We also onsider a government's hoie ofan optimal bankrupty law maximizing the soial welfare. We nd that the opti-mal toughness of the bankrupty law depends on the extent of liquidation osts.We further nd that a possibility of renegotiation may inrease the soial surplus,as less rms are liquidated. Our results are supported by empirial evidene onthe atual use of bankrupty around the world. Using a dataset of 32 ountries(Claessens and Klapper, 2005), we study the eet of the level of toughness ofthe bankrupty law and the eet of dierent levels of ompetition in the bankingmarket on the number of liquidations.The hapter is organized as follows. Setion 3.2 desribes the speiation ofthe model. Setion 3.3 haraterizes the solution of the bargaining game betweenthe debtor (rm) and the reditor in the ase with and without renegotiation.Setion 3.4 analyzes the hoie of soially optimal level of bankrupty law for dif-ferent degrees of ompetition in the redit market. Setion 3.5 provides empirialevidene supporting the results of the model. In setion 3.6 we summarize themain results of the hapter.3.2 Setup3.2.1 Bankrupty lawOur modeling of the bankrupty law is motivated by Biais and Mariotti (2003).We denote the toughness of the bankrupty law in our model as a one-dimensionalvariable α on the spae [0,1℄. If the bankrupty law is equal 1, this is a very tough59
law. Whenever the rm is insolvent, it is liquidated and the reditor gets thefull ollateral. On the other hand, if the bankrupty law is equal to 0, then theinsolvent rm is never liquidated.Expressing the bankrupty law by one variable an be justied in several ways:we an see the toughness of the bankrupty law as a level of disretion given tothe judge or as a probability that the bankrupty proedure will be started.3 Thebankrupty law that gives little disretion power to the judge is seen as a toughlaw, an extreme example of no disretion is an automati trigger on bankrupties.This provision (e.g. in Hungary between 1991 - 1993) requires the rm whihholds overdue debts of any size to any reditor to initiate bankrupty (see Janda(2004)).3.2.2 ModelIn our model we onsider an eonomy onsisting of a risk-neutral entrepreneur(a rm), a reditor and a government that designs the bankrupty law. Theentrepreneur needs funds to nane the projet. The projet yields return R withprobability p and yields 0 with probability 1−p, the osts of the projet are I. Theoutome of the projet annot be observed by the reditor. The expeted valueof the projet is positive, i.e. pR− I > 0. The rm asks for redit C to a reditorto over the whole investment osts, i.e. C = I. If the projet is suessful, theentrepreneur is supposed to pay bak the endogenously determined prie of theredit T . Stages of the game are as follows:In the rst stage, the government sets up the bankrupty law α.In the seond stage nature deides whether the rm is suessful or not in3Cornelli and Felli (1997b) and Giammarino and Nosal (1999) argue that dierent bankruptylaw provisions might have dierent eets on the player's behavior. For example, the monitoringinentives of the reditor may or may not be ompatible with a proedure that either alwaysomplies with or always violates absolute priority rule and therefore it might be diult to assesthe bankrupty law in a one-dimensional manner.60
performing the projet. The entrepreneur obtains from the reditor a redit Ito over the osts of the projet and the prie T he is supposed to pay bak isdetermined. In the analysis, we onsider how dierent levels of ompetition inredit market inuene the prie.In the third stage, the unsuessful rm has to laim default. The suessfulrm an deide whether to laim being suessful and pay bak the redit orto laim default. It hooses a possibly mixed strategy so that it defaults withprobability d ∈ [0, 1] and pays bak the redit with probability 1 − d (d as adefault rate). In ase the rm delares default, it does not pay bak the debt andthe reditor has the right to seize the assets of the rm, i.e. the bank an takepossession of the ollateral and the return of the projet.The expeted value of ollateral for the reditor is determined by the toughnessof the bankrupty law. If the reditor liquidates the rm, he obtains a liquidationvalue αL. Taking over the projet by the reditor inorporates some dead-weightloss as well, namely γ ∈ [0, 1]. The reditor valuation of the suessful and un-suessful projet is then γR and 0, respetively. We also assume that I > L, thereditor annot reover the full ost of the projet in ase of projet failure. Asthe projet realization is not observable for the reditor, the payment obligation
T annot be onditioned on the result of the projet. Whenever the rm is liq-uidated, the manager loses a non-transferable private benet B. We assume that
B > L, whih results in a fat that liquidation is ineient. This assumption ismotivated by our fous on a soft bankrupty law, whih is often justied as a wayto avoid ineient liquidation (Biais and Raasens, 2000).4 Sine the entrepre-neur has information about the outome of the projet, he needs some inentivesto pay bak T when the projet is suessful. These inentives are reated by thereditor's right to liquidate the rm, in ase he delares default. The threat ofliquidation makes the debtor pay bak the debt. However, there is still plae for4The assumption does not seem to be unrealisti if we inorporate in the parameter B also thesoial osts of liquidation. However, for brevity of notation we abstain from a spei parameter.61
renegotiation as the liquidation is ineient. Renegotiation has a negative eeton the debtor's inentive to pay bak the debt.In the fourth stage, the reditor deides whether to aept the renaningoer of the defaulted rm or liquidate the rm and obtain remaining assets of therm. We again allow for random strategy, the reditor aepts the renaningoer and does not liquidate the rm with probability 1− b and liquidates the rmwith probability b (b as a bankrupty rate). The renegotiation oer is modelledas follows. We assume that eah projet generates the ertain return of X if thisprojet is renaned with additional investment I, making the net prot R0.5Assume that the renegotiation oer from a rm is: Renane us with addi-tional apital and we will pay you for sure the net prot R0. The manager doesnot have to oer neessarily the whole return of the renaned projet X, howeverhe still has a motivation to make this renegotiation oer beause with renaningthe rm is not liquidated and he does not lose his private benet B. The spe-iation of renaning is motivated by Berglöf and Roland (1997). We assumethat the net renegotiation oer R0 does not reover the osts of the projet, i.e.
R0 < I. We also assume that the renaning oer is never larger than the ol-lateral, i.e. R0 < L.6 The renaning option is ineient for the reditor ex-ante(the reditor annot reover the osts of the investment), but might be eient inthe stage, when the rm turns out to be insolvent if the value of the renaningoer is higher than the expeted liquidation value of the ollateral. The reditor'shoie whether to aept the renaning oer depends on the expeted liquidationvalue that is inuened by the toughness of the bankrupty law. The reditor an-not observe whether the defaulted rm was suessful or not. The inentives toliquidate a suessful rm are higher beause the reditor obtains by liquidationnot only the ollateral but also a part of the projet.5This assumption that eah projet an generate ertain return as part of the projet an besaved if additional apital is invested6We want to fous only on a relevant parameter spae. If R0 would be larger than L, thereditor would never use liquidation. 62
The possibility of renaning implies that default will not always be penalizedby liquidation and both parties realize this. As the reditor annot ommit toalways liquidate the defaulted rm, suessful rm might use strategi default.This means that the suessful rm does not pay bak the debt, laims defaultand hopes the reditor aepts its renaning oer, and the rm keeps the returnof the projet. The strategi default inentives are weakened by posting ollat-eral, beause it inreases the probability that the rm will be liquidated in aseof default. Both players (the reditor and the entrepreneur) have symmetri in-formation about the protability of the projet ex-ante, hene there is no adverseseletion problem. Due to the presene of asymmetri information, the model issolved using the perfet Bayesian equilibrium onept.The game tree is presented in Figure 3.1, the timing of the game in Figure 3.2.
3.3 Optimal ontrat3.3.1 Case without renegotiationFirst, we analyze the ase if there is no renegotiation possible. This means that thereditor always liquidates the defaulted ompany and the entrepreneur does nothave any inentives to delare strategi default as this would result in loss of theprivate benet and outome of suessful projet for sure. Simply all unsuessfulrms (1 − p) will be liquidated. The liquidation rate does not depend on thetoughness of the bankrupty law α.Proposition 3.1. Assume absene of renegotiation, when the reditor ommitsto liquidate the rm in ase of failure. The optimal bankrupty law is α = 1.63
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Figure 3.1: The Game-Tree
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Figure 3.2: Timing
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Proof. See AppendixThe toughness of the bankrupty law does not inuenes the liquidation rate,i.e. how many rms will be liquidated. As the entrepreneur knows that in thease of default the rm will be always liquidated he does not default strategially.The toughness of the bankrupty law does not bring any additional inentives tothe entrepreneur to pay bak the debt. Therefore it is soially optimal to havevery tough law that minimizes the ost of the liquidation.3.3.2 Case with renegotiationIn this setion we present the solution of the game between the debtor and thereditor and we haraterize the optimal ontrat. The bankrupty law gives thereditor the right to liquidate the rm that delared default. This devie givesan inentive to the entrepreneur not to laim default in ase the projet wassuessful. If the rm ould not be liquidated, the entrepreneur would not loseanything laiming default, moreover he retains the whole prot as he does not paybak the debt. However, being aware of the renaning option, the entrepreneurmight still laim default of the suessful projet and hope for renaning (i.e.avoiding liquidation) even though the bankrupty law is present. In this sense therenaning softens the hard budget onstraint reated by a bankrupty law.Solving the game, we are looking for the perfet Bayesian equilibrium. Eahagent's behavior has to be optimal given the other agent's behavior. The agent'sbelieves about the atual projet realization have to be onsistent with updatedprior probabilities aording to the Bayes' rule.The posterior probability q(d) that the projet was suessful when default isobserved by a reditor is:
q(d) =
pd
1 − p + pd
(3.1)65
The reditor updates his believes when he observes a rm's ation (a rm laimingdefault or not). The probability of strategi default d is derived endogenouslyfrom the model. In equilibrium the reditor forms rational expetations and afterobserving the default he onludes that the projet was suessful with probability
q(d) and unsuessful with (1 − q(d)).Proposition 3.2. The optimal deision of the debtor and the reditor about thedefault and bankrupty is haraterized as follows:
• If the bankrupty law is soft, i.e. α < α1 = R0−pγRL then the reditor neverliquidates the rm (b = 0) and the debtor always laims strategi default(d = 1). No projet is naned.
• If the bankrupty law is tough, i.e. α > α2 = R0L then the reditor alwaysliquidates the rm (b = 1) and the debtor never laims strategi default(d = 0).
• If the bankrupty law is intermediate, i.e. α1 < α < α2 then the equilibriumis haraterized by:
b∗ =
T
B + R
(3.2)
d∗ =
(1 − p)(R0 − αL)
p(γR + αL − R0)
(3.3)Proof. See AppendixWe an split the toughness of the bankrupty law into three intervals. Weregard the bankrupty law to be soft if α < α1 = R0−pγRL . In this ase therenaning oer is always preferred, i.e. the reditor always aepts the renaningoer. However, the entrepreneur is aware of the fat that the reditor will neverliquidate the rm and therefore he always laims strategi default. The reditor's66
expeted prot is negative beause renaning is ex-ante non-protable and herather does not provide any funds at the rst plae. Hene, if the bankrupty lawis soft, i.e. α < α1, no projet is naned.The bankrupty law is tough, if α > α2 = R0L . In this ase, the reditor willnever aept the renaning oer beause the liquidation gives him a higher payoeven liquidating the unsuessful projet. Hene, the entrepreneur never laimsstrategi default as this gives him learly negative payo. Only the unsuessfulprojet is liquidated.If the toughness of the bankrupty law lies between α1 and α2 we all it in-termediate bankrupty law. In this interval it is protable for the reditor toliquidate the suessful rm as the ollateral value plus the value of the projetis higher than the renaning oer. Aepting the renaning oer is protablefor the reditor in ase the projet failed. However, as the reditor does not ob-serve the return of the projet, he randomizes about his deision to liquidate orto aept the renaning oer. The mixed strategy equilibrium desribed in theProposition 3.2 may be viewed as the belief of the two players onerning theiropponents' behavior. The equilibrium rate of b makes the suessful entrepreneurindierent between paying bak the debt or faing the reditors hoie of aept-ing the renegotiation oer or liquidation. The default rate d makes the reditorindierent whether to liquidate the rm that laimed default or not.The default rate d∗ is negatively related to the toughness of the bankruptylaw.
∂d∗
∂α
= −
(1 − p)γLR
p(γR + αL − R0)2
< 0As the toughness of the bankrupty law inreases, the renaning option beomesless protable for the reditor ompared to the liquidation. The debtor is aware ofthis fat and that leads to less use of strategi default. The prie of the redit Tdoes not inuene the probability of strategi default d∗, as this does not inuenethe reditor's deision about liquidation versus renaning. However, the prie of67
the redit positively inuenes the bankrupty rate b∗. If the prie of the redit Tis high, the suessful debtor an gain more not paying bak the debt, thereforethe reditor has to use bankrupty more often.Optimal ontrat - renegotiation aseIn the previous setion we have found the optimal rm's deision about default andoptimal reditor's deision about bankrupty. Deisions about bankrupty andstrategi default are made in the last periods. Solving our problem by bakwardindution we now solve the optimum ontrat, given the equilibrium probabilitiesof strategi default d∗ and the bankrupty rate b∗. We nd the optimal prie ofthe redit for dierent levels of ompetition in the redit market. The payo ofthe reditor is:
πcreditor = p(1 − d
∗)T + (1 − p + pd∗)R0 − I (3.4)The rm's payo is:
πfirm = p(R + B − T ) + (1 − p)(1 − b
∗)B (3.5)First, we onsider the monopolisti redit market. We model the monopoly asesuh as there is only one reditor and many rms that want to get a redit. Thisgives the reditor large bargaining power.Lemma 3.1. Assume a monopolisti redit market, where the reditor makes atake-it-or-leave-it oer to the rm. The equilibrium prie of the redit T is equalto
T ∗mon = R + B (3.6)Proof. We set the partiipation onstraint of the rm equal to zero and solve for
T . We nd the highest prie of the redit T ∗mon, the rm an still pay.68
The reditor is able to extrat the whole surplus from the rm and brings itto zero utility. The monopoly prie is then Tmon = R + B. This leads to thebankrupty rate b∗ = 1. As the reditor extrats the whole surplus from theentrepreneur, he is indierent whether to pay bak the redit or always laimdefault. We assume that in equilibrium the rm always pays the redit bak.Then, we obtain an equilibrium where the suessful rm always pays bak andthe unsuessful rm laims default and is always liquidated. This solves theproblem of the ommitment of the reditor. The monopolist does not neessarilymaximizes the soial surplus, as he does not internalize the dead weight loss ausedby liquidation. As mentioned above, if the monopolisti reditor extrats thewhole rent from the debtor, it is always protable to liquidate the rm. However, ifwe assume that the monopolisti reditor does not extrat the whole rent from thedebtor, the liquidation from the point of the reditor will not always be optimal.Dierent degrees of ompetitionWe have shown that the maximum value the entrepreneur an pay for the reditis T = R + B. In order to analyze dierent ompetition environments, we denotethe degree of ompetition in the redit market as θ. This variable expresses howmuh of the return of the projet the reditor obtains: high θ stands for low levelof ompetition, low θ stands for intensive ompetition. We express the prie ofthe redit as
T ∗ = θ(R + B) (3.7)If θ = 1, the reditor has absolute monopoly power and an extrat the wholesurplus of the projet from the entrepreneur, T = R + B.In the partiular ase of perfet ompetition, where the whole surplus stayswith the rm and the reditor's partiipation onstraint is binding, the equilibrium69
prie of the redit T ∗com an be expressed as:
T ∗com = θmin(R + B) (3.8)We fous only on the relevant parameter spae, when the partiipation onstraintof the bank is positive. This gives us the interval of θ: [θmin, 1], where
θmin =
(αL − R0)I + γR(I − (1 − p)R0)
(αL + pγR − R0)(R + B)
(3.9)The optimal prie of the redit T ∗com is negatively dependent on α.
∂T ∗com
∂α
= −
(1 − p)γLR(I − R0)
αL + γpR − R0))2A higher α leads to less strategi default d∗, and as the reditor prots from alower default rate, he aepts lower prie of the redit.3.4 Optimal bankrupty lawIn the previous setion we have determined the optimal ontrat. In this setionwe analyze the government's hoie of the toughness of the bankrupty law tomaximize soial welfare. Soial surplus is dened as the sum of all benets andosts in the eonomy. In our model there is a need for bankrupty proedurebeause without the threat the entrepreneur has no inentives to delare that theprojet was suessful and pay bak the redit. To optimally set the level of thetoughness of the bankrupty law, the government has to take into aount twoeets of the bankrupty law that inuene soial welfare. First, there is a dead-weight loss aused by liquidation (1− α)L; a higher level of α dereases this loss.Seond, the toughness of the bankrupty law inuenes the probability that therm will be liquidated, the liquidation rate. We analyze the relationship betweenthe toughness of the bankrupty law and the liquidation rate in a separate setion.70
3.4.1 Liquidation rateThe probability that the rm will be liquidated (liquidation rate) depends not onlyon the bankrupty rate, i.e. on the probability the reditor deides to liquidate,but also on the probability of strategi default, i.e. on the probability the rmwill heat. It is easy to see that the liquidation rate β is:
β = b∗(1 − p + pd∗) (3.10)To evaluate the eet of the toughness of bankrupty law on the liquidation rate westudy the separate eets on the bankrupty and default rate. If the bankruptylaw is relatively tough, making the liquidation option always protable for thereditor, the optimal bankrupty rate is equal to zero and the optimal defaultrate is equal to 1. This gives us a liquidation rate of 1 − p. This is exatly theshare of unsuessful rms. Under very soft law the optimal bankrupty ratewould be zero and the default rate equal to 1. However under these onditions noprojet will be naned in the formal bankrupty proedure setting.The last ase lies in the interval of mixed strategies. The liquidation rate inthis ase is a funtion of the level of reditor's protetion (toughness of bankruptylaw). Plugging in the optimal rates of bankrupty we obtain:
β =
T ∗
B + R
(1 − p + pd∗) (3.11)Proposition 3.3. In the mixed strategy region (α ∈ (α1, α2)) the liquidation rate
β is lower in the more ompetitive redit market.Proof. As the liquidation rate diers only by the prie of the redit T , it is obviousthat the liquidation rate is higher for higher θ.If the reditor operates in a less ompetitive market he an ask for a largerprie of the redit from the entrepreneur. A higher prie of the redit inreases the71
debtor inentives to use strategi default, beause the benet of default inreasesas the prie the debtor has to pay inreases. The reditor then has to punishthe debtor more often. Therefore, higher prie of the redit leads to a higherbankrupty rate. It follows that the liquidation rate is higher for lower degrees ofompetition.Proposition 3.4. In the mixed strategy region (α ∈ (α1, α2)) the liquidation rate
β is negatively dependent on the toughness of the bankrupty law α.Proof. See AppendixThe eet of the bankrupty law on the liquidation rate is twofold. First,the toughness of the bankrupty law inuenes negatively the default rate d∗.As the bankrupty law beomes tougher, the renegotiation option beomes lessattrative for the reditor, therefore the debtor is using strategi default less often,
d∗ dereases. Seond, the toughness of the bankrupty law aets the bankruptyrate. However, the eet is valid only in the perfet ompetition setting. Tougherbankrupty law inreases the reditor's payo and therefore he aepts a lowerprie of the redit T . This makes the option of strategi default less attrative(the gain of not paying bak is lower) and the reditor does not have to usebankrupty so often, the bankrupty rate b∗com dereases. In a less ompetitivemarket, the bankrupty law does not inuene the bankrupty rate. Therefore theadditional eet on delining number of liquidation is laking leading to higherliquidation rates. Now we ompare the liquidation rate in the mixed strategyregion (α ∈ (α1, α2)) with the region of the tough bankrupty law (α > α2).Proposition 3.5. There exists αliq in the interval of mixed strategy (α ∈ (α1, α2))suh that the liquidation rate β(αliq < α < α2) is smaller than the liquidationrate under the tough bankrupty law (α > α2) for all degrees of ompetition θ,
θmin < θ < 1.Proof. See Appendix 72
This proposition shows us that the probability that the rm will be liquidated(liquidation rate) in the mixed strategies region is lower than in the region of thetough bankrupty law for ertain levels of α. In other words, there exists ertainlevels of α suh that the probability of being liquidated in the region of mixedstrategies is lower than the probability of being unsuessful.The example of liquidation rate under limited ompetition (θ = 0.9 and θ =
0.6) is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The parameter θ expresses the distane betweenthe two liquidation rates (between solid and dash line).
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Figure 3.3: Liquidation Rate with respet to the toughness of the bankrupty law:
R = 10; R0 = 3; I = 5; γ = 0.1; p = 0.5; L = 5; B = 1. Dashed line representsliquidation rate under θ = 0.6, solid line stays for θ = 0.9.
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3.4.2 The government's hoie of the optimal bankruptylawAs we mentioned, there is a need for bankrupty proedure beause without thisthreat, the entrepreneur has no inentives to delare that the projet was suessfuland pay bak the redit. From the ex-post eieny it would be optimal not tohave any bankrupty law, so that the reditor always aepts the renegotiationoer and never liquidates the rm. However, this would distort the entrepreneur'sinentive to admit being suessful and he always laims strategi default. Thequestion is how to balane the features of the bankrupty law suh that the ostsof the ineient bankrupty are the lowest (limitation of number of liquidations),but the entrepreneur still has inentives not to heat the reditor.The government's payo in the mixed strategy interval (intermediate bank-rupty law, (α1, α2)) an be written:
Ginter = p(1 − d
∗)(R + B) + pd∗b∗(αL + γR) + (1 − p)b∗αL
+ pd∗(1 − b∗)(R + B + R0) + (1 − p)(1 − b
∗)(R0 + B) − I (3.12)
∂Ginter
∂a
=
γL(1 − p)R((B + R)θ − R0)
(α L + γR − R0)2
> 0 , for θ ∈ (θmin, 1)As ∂Ginter/∂α is positive, the highest payo in this interval is for α = α2,beause the liquidation rate is dereasing in this interval and the lower is theliquidation rate the higher is the soial welfare. Moreover, higher α leads to lowerdead-weight loss of ineient liquidation.In the interval of tough bankrupty law (α > α2), b = 1 and d = 0, and thegovernment's payo an be written as:
Gtough = p(R + B) + (1 − p)αL − I (3.13)74
The highest payo in this interval is learly for α = 1, as the liquidation rate isthe same for all levels of α and the dead-weight loss assoiated with the liquidationof the rm dereases with higher α. It follows that in the government's hoie ofthe optimal bankrupty law we onsider only α = α2 and α = 1.There are two fores going against eah other. On the one hand, tougher law(higher α) dereases the eieny loss (αL). On the other hand, the atual lossis also inuened by the liquidation rate. If the toughness of the bankrupty lawis dereased to reah the interval (α1, α2), the eieny loss is higher than for
α = 1. However, the liquidation rate is lower as we show in Proposition 3.5. Thefollowing proposition disusses the hoie of the optimal bankrupty law.Proposition 3.6. The government's payo for the level of the bankrupty law
α = α2 is larger than the government's payo for α = 1 if the private benet
B > B1. The B1 is dened as:
B1 =
L − R0
1 − θProof. See AppendixWe have shown that the government's payo in the intermediate bankruptylaw interval is larger than the government's payo in the interval of the toughbankrupty law if the osts of liquidation (private benets) are high enough. Thesoial surplus depends on the extent of ineieny of liquidation. The level ofineieny of liquidation is inuened by the level of ollateralization and theextent of private benets. If the osts of liquidation are high enough (the privatebenets are high (B > B1) then there exists an interval, where the government'spayo under the soft bankrupty law is higher than the government's payo underthe tough law. This result omes from the fat that under the soft law there isan interval where there is less liquidation and the projet is still naned. Thishappens if the bankrupty law is relatively soft, so that the reditor does notalways favor liquidation, but the law is still not too soft for the rms to use75
strategi default extensively as they are afraid of liquidation. However, if the softlaw enourages too many strategi defaults, the government's payo maximizingsoial welfare is higher under tough bankrupty law.We an also see that the level of B1 depends positively on θ. This meansthat for a given level of private benet B, the optimal level of the toughness ofthe bankrupty law under lower ompetition (higher θ) might be α = 1, whilethe optimal law under more intensive ompetition would be α = α2. This mightresult in tougher bankrupty law and more liquidations under less ompetitiveenvironment.3.5 Empirial evideneIn this setion we are going to disuss the results of our model in the ontextof empirial researh on the use of bankrupty around the world, and we alsotest results of our model using a sample of 32 ountries. Our hypothesis are: 1)There exists an interval of the toughness of the bankrupty law where tougherbankrupty law results in a lower number of liquidations; 2) Countries with lessompetitive redit market experiene higher number of liquidations.Our results are in line with some empirial observations on the use of bank-rupty law. Claessens and Klapper (2005) found that ountries with better lawenforement (judiial eieny) have higher rates of liquidation. The toughness ofthe bankrupty law seems not to have a signiant inuene in ountries with badjudiial eieny. However, in ountries with good judiial eieny, the redi-tor's protetion negatively inuenes the liquidation rates. Djankov et al. (2003)nd that ountries with very bad eieny of bankrupty proedure do not usebankrupty at all and prefer out-of-ourt negotiations. Comparing with our theo-retial results we believe that the toughness of bankrupty law depends not onlyon the reditor's rights protetion but also on the law enforement. In our model,76
ountries with good judiial eieny an reah the region of mixed strategies,where the extent of reditor's right has a negative inuene on the liquidationrate. However, in ountries with bad ourts, the toughness of the bankrupty lawdoes not play a role as rms always use strategi default and are not naned inthe framework of bankrupty proedure, i.e. use dierent ways of naning basedon out-of-ourt negotiations.There is empirial evidene in the law and nane literature that nds a pos-itive relationship between a degree of reditor's protetion and a development ofredit markets (La Porta et al., 1997). A better reditor's protetion togetherwith a better judiial eieny might introdue the use of formal bankruptyproedure, hene inreasing the number of bankrupties. With further inreaseof the toughness of bankrupty law, the liquidation rate dereases as the use ofstrategi default dereases. This observation is also supported by empirial re-searh of Pistor et al. (2000) and Pistor (2000). They nd that in transitionountries development of redit markets is signiantly inuened by quality oflegal enforement but not the toughness of reditor's protetion.For our analysis we use the dataset of Claessens and Klapper (2005). Theyollet the total number of ommerial bankrupty lings from government andprivate soures around the world in years 1990-1999. In order to ompare therelative use of bankrupty aross ountries, the number of bankrupty lings isnormalized by the number of rms in the ountry. We use this variable of nor-malized number of bankrupty llings as our dependent variable apturing theextent of liquidation in the ountry. The summary statistis are presented in Ta-ble 3.1. Similar as in Claessens and Klapper (2005) as explanatory variables weuse measures of ountry eonomi performane (lagged GDP per apita in US$LAGGDP, lagged growth rate of real GDP LAGGROWTH).7 Further we use ameasure of judiial eieny (RULE OF LAW) as reported by La Porta et al.(1997) for developed ountries and by Pistor et al. (2000) for transition ountries.7World Eonomi Outlook Database http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2005/02/data/77
This variable assesses the eieny of ourts in the ountry on the sale from 0(least eient) to 10 (most eient). Then we use a measure of reditor's rightsprotetion (CREDITOR) as reported in in Djankov et al. (2005). This is a mea-sure based on the methodology of La Porta et al. (1997) evaluating the quality ofreditor protetion on the sale from 0 (worst protetion) to 4 (best protetion).In order to apture the eet of ountry legal's origin we inlude dummies for vemajor legal system families as reported by La Porta et al. (1997): Frenh ivillaw, English ommon law, German law, Sandinavian law and legal system oftransition ountries (FRENCH, COMMON, GERMAN, SCANDINAVIAN, andTRANSITION). As a measure of ompetition on the redit market we use the de-gree of onentration in the banking industry, alulated as the fration of assetsheld by the three largest ommerial banks in eah ountry in eah year in theperiod 1990-99 (BANKCONC).8The data are set as a panel of ountries. As we do not have the observation ofthe liquidation rates for all ountries for all years we have an unbalaned panel.For estimation we use several tehniques. In the rst seven regression reportedin Table 3.2 and in Table 3.3 in Appendix we use a simple OLS model inludingthe time dummies for eah year. In the rst regression we onrm the results ofClaessens and Klapper (2005). The ountries with higher level of GDP have highernumber of liquidations in the next period. On the other hand and as expeted,GDP growth rate negatively inuenes the number of liquidations. RULE OFLAW has a positive eet on the bankrupty lings, reditor's protetion has apositive eet but it is signiant only when also RULE OF LAW is inluded. Inthe next regressions we fous on the eet of the ompetition on the redit market.Regression (2) shows that the degree of onentration of the banking marketpositively inuenes the number of liquidations. The less intensive is the level ofompetition in the banking market the higher is the number of bankrupty lings.In regression (3) we onstrut an interation term between the RULE OF LAW8The variable is from the Fith's BankSope database reported in Demirgu-Kunt (2004).78
and CREDITOR. The eet of the interation term is negative, suggesting that inountries with better judiial eieny, better reditor's protetion leads to loweruse of bankrupties. The bank onentration remains positive and statistiallysigniant at 1 per ent signiane level.In the next regressions ((4) and (5)) we use our onstruted dummy variablesRULE5 and RULE8, where the dummy equals 1 if the RULE OF LAW in theountry is larger than 8 and larger than 5, respetively, to divide the ountriesinto two groups aording to their ourts eieny. Now we an better interpretthe interation term. In ounties with good judiial eieny, a better reditor'sprotetion leads to lower use of bankrupty. On the other hand in ountries withpoor ourts eieny, a tougher bankrupty law (better reditor's protetion)leads to a higher number of bankrupties. We see that the results are relativelyrobust as they do not dier for the RULE5 and RULE8 speiations.In the next panel of regressions we inlude measures of legal origin. TheSandinavian and ommon law legal origin as well as transition legal system have apositive eet on the number of liquidations, whereas the Frenh legal system has anegative eet on the number of liquidations. However, the oeients for Frenhand transition ountries are not always statistially signiant. The German legalorigin variable is inluded in the onstant. The eet of onentration in thebanking setor remains signiant for all speiations.In the last two regressions ((8) and (9)) we use xed eet analysis ontrollingfor time as well as ountry eet inluding the lagged growth variable (LAG-GROWTH), lagged GDP (LAGGDP), reditor's protetion (CREDITOR) andbank onentration (BANKCONC). In the seond speiation we also inludethe measure for the size of the redit market (PRIVATE CREDIT); the variablemeasures private redit by deposit money banks to GDP.9 In both speiationsthe eet of bank onentration on the number of liquidations is positive andstatistially signiant at 10 and 1 per ent level respetively.9The variable is from the Fith's BankSope database reported in Demirgu-Kunt (2004).79
It is lear that the toughness of the bankrupty law depends on the level ofreditor's protetion (CREDITOR) as well as on the judiial eieny (RULEOF LAW) in the ountry. We believe that a ertain level of the toughness ofthe bankrupty law annot be reahed without a minimal level of the rule of lawin the ountry. In the ontext of our model, only ountries with good judiialeieny an reah the interval of mixed strategy equilibria. In this interval, atougher bankrupty law results in a lower number of liquidation. In ontrast,in the ountries with a poor quality of ourts, the level of reditor's protetionleads either to no naning if the reditor's right are not proteted enough orthe ountry may eliminate the role of ourts (eieny of the ourts) in thebankrupty proedure implementing a bankrupty law with automati triggeror similar design, leading to a high number of bankrupties. If the ourts arenot working properly and the reditor annot rely on them, the liquidation doesnot threaten the debtor. However, a tougher law might allow naning and therealization of projets that were not naned before. As some of the projets arenot protable, this results in higher liquidation rates ompared to the situationwhen no projets are naned.We argue that as the law enforement improved in developed ountries, theydid not have to rely on very tough bankrupty law assuring the mobilization ofapital for investment and soften the quality suh that the reditors still preferrenaning of defaulted rms, but suessful rms are threaten by speed ationof ourts and do not laim strategi default so often, leading to less liquidation.Only ountries with good judiial eieny an aord the softer bankrupty law.However, explanation is more intuitive and need to be modelled expliitly, theonept of interation between the judiial eieny and the reditor's protetionis a topi for a further researh.
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3.6 ConlusionsWe study a simple debtor-reditor model with state veriation problem and red-itor's impossibility of preommitment to no renegotiation. We found that thereexists a mixed strategy equilibrium interval of the bankrupty law where the liq-uidation rate is negatively dependent on the toughness of the bankrupty law.Moreover, there is a level of bankrupty law in the mixed strategy intermediatebankrupty law suh that the liquidation rate is lower than having a very toughbankrupty law. We show that less ompetitive redit markets have higher liqui-dation rate in the interval of mixed strategies. If the liquidation osts are relativelysmall then tough bankrupty law is soially optimal. Under high liquidation osts,softer bankrupty law is preferred. We also nd that the soial welfare is lower inless ompetitive redit markets due to a larger number of liquidations.The mixed strategy equilibrium appears due to the option of renegotiation.As the soial welfare for the level of bankrupty law from the mixed strategyequilibrium interval might be larger then the soial welfare under tough (whihatually equals to the soial welfare without renegotiation), renegotiation anenhane welfare.Empirial evidene of Claessens and Klapper (2005) supports our ndingsabout the relationship between the number of liquidations and the toughness ofthe bankrupty law and judiial eieny. On the one hand, tougher bankruptylaw in ountries with good judiial system results in lower number of liquidations.On the other hand, in ountries with ineetive ourts tougher law leads to highernumber of liquidations. We also provide empirial evidene on the higher numberof liquidations in ountries with less ompetitive redit market.
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3.A AppendixProof Proposition 3.1Proof. The payo if the entrepreneur is given:
πentrepreneur = p(R + B − T ) + (1 − p) · 0 (3.14)The payo if the reditor is given:
πcreditor = pT + (1 − p)αL − I (3.15)The soial welfare is given then:
SW = p(R + B − T + T ) + (1 − p)(αL) (3.16)It is obvious that the bankrupty law α = 1 minimizes the osts of liquidation(hange of property) and hene maximizes the soial welfare.Proof Proposition 3.2Proof. Solving the perfet Bayesian equilibrium, we proeed in three followingsteps.1. In the rst step rm deides whether to default strategially or not. Thedeision of a rm about default is:
• No strategi default if R − T + B > (1 − b)(R + B) + b · 0
• Strategi default if R − T + B < (1 − b)(R + B) + b · 02. Then we update the reditor's believe aording to the expression (3.1).82
3. In the next step the bank makes a deision about bankrupty
• Bankrupty delared if π(d)(γR + αL) + (1 − π(d))αL > R0
• Bankrupty not delared if π(d)(γR + αL) + (1 − π(d))αL < R0Creditor never uses bankrupty (b = 0)Now we test whether b = 0 is an equilibrium. Following the three steps desribedabove:1. Firm laims default (as R + B − T < R + B) ⇒ d = 12. Posterior probability π(d = 1) = p3. Creditor does not liquidate the rm if p(γR+αL)+ (1−p)αL < R0 i.e. if:
α < α1 =
R0 − pγR
L
(3.17)If α < α1, there is a pure strategy equilibrium b = 0, d = 1. Outside thisinterval b = 0 annot be an equilibrium, beause our assumption would benot onsistent with the bank's ation.It follows that in the interval [R0−pγR
L
), R0
L
] there is no pure strategy equilibrium,only mixed strategy is possible.Creditor always uses bankrupty (b = 1)Now we test whether b = 1 is an equilibrium.1. Firm does not laim default (R + B − T > 0) ⇒ d = 02. Posterior probability π(d = 0) = 083
3. Creditor liquidates the rm if αL > R0 ⇒Only if α > α2 = R0L our assumption b = 1 is onsistent with the reditor'sation and we have pure strategy equilibrium b = 1 and d = 0 on the interval
α > R0/L. Outside this interval is the reditor's ation not onsistent withour guess of equilibrium ⇒ b = 1 annot be an equilibrium.Mixed strategy equilibrium (0 < b < 1)Firm has to be indierent between laiming default not laiming default.
R + B − T = (1 − b)(R + B) (3.18)Creditor has to be indierent between laiming bankrupty and not laimingbankrupty.
π(d)(γR + αL) + (1 − π(d))αL = R0 (3.19)Solving (3.18) and (3.19) for b and d we nd the mixed strategy equilibrium.
d∗ =
(1 − p)(R0 − αL)
p(γR + αL − R0)
b∗ =
T
B + RIt is straightforward the b∗ and d∗ ∈ [0, 1] for α ∈ [R0−pγR
L
), R0
L
]Proof Proposition 3.4Proof. First we onsider the perfet ompetition ase. The partial derivation of
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βcom with respet to α is equal:
∂βcom
∂α
=
∂d∗
∂α
pb∗com + (1 − p + pd
∗)
∂b∗com
∂α
(3.20)
= −
γRL(1 − p)
p(aL + γR − R0)2
p
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
∗
bcom
︸︷︷︸
>0
− (1 − p + pd∗)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
γRL(1 − p)(I − R0)
(B + R)(aL + pγR − R0)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0If we onsider the ase with less intensive ompetition, the only dierene is in thebankrupty rate b∗, as ∂b∗
∂α
= 0. Therefore, the seond part of expression (3.20) isequal to zero and it is obvious that also ∂β
∂α
< 0. Moreover, we an say that
∂βcom
∂α
<
∂β
∂α
< 0
Proof Proposition 3.5Proof. The liquidation rate in the mixed-strategy interval depends on the levelof reditor rights protetion Proposition 3.4. We an nd the level of reditor'sprotetion αliq suh that the liquidation rate in mixed strategy equilibria is equalto the liquidation rate in a very tough law, i.e. in the pure strategy region wherethe reditor always liquidates the defaulted rm. Then, we hek whether this
αliq is lower or larger than the α2 that determines the mixed strategy region. If
αliq is smaller than α2, it is lear that there exists α suh that the liquidation ratein mixed strategy region is smaller than the liquidation rate under a tough law.
β(α1,α2) − (1 − p) < 0 (3.21)
if
α > αliq =
R0 − γR(1 − θ)
L
(3.22)
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We an show that
α2 − αliq =
γR(1 − θ)
L
(3.23)It follows, that the αliq < α2, for θ < 1 . Then, there always exists suh an α,
β < 1 − p.Proof Proposition 3.6Proof. The struture of the proof is similar to the proof of proposition 3.5. Weompare the soial welfare under α = 1 and soial welfare for α < R0/L. Gintermediate−
G(α = 1) > 0 if α > αsoc.
αsoc =
(B − L + (θ − γ)R)R0 − γ((1 − θ)B − L)R
L(B − L + θR)
(3.24)We found that
R0/L − αsoc =
γR((1 − θ)B − L + R0)
L(B − L + θR)This expression is larger then 0 if B > B1, where
B1 =
L − R0
1 − θ
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Table 3.1: Summary StatistisCountry GDP YEARS LIQ.(%) CONC. CREDITOR RULEArgentina 7081.04 92-99 0.12 0.36 1 5.35Australia 19309.32 90-99 2.1 0.63 1 10Austria 25058.76 90-99 1.33 0.44 3 10Belgium 23961.26 90-99 2.59 0.75 2 10Canada 20661.69 90-98 2.96 0.56 1 10Chile 4261.84 90-99 0.28 2 7.02Colombia 2157.03 96-99 0.16 0 2.08Czeh Republi 4615.02 92-96 1.49 0.72 3 8.3Denmark 30264.4 90-99 1.53 0.71 3 10Finland 23667.6 90-98 4.14 0.75 1 10Frane 23330.94 90-99 2.62 0.33 0 8.98Germany 25855.59 92-98 1.03 0.32 3 9.23Greee 10310.68 90-94 0.29 0.71 1 6.18Hong Kong 20967.57 90-98 0.55 4 8.22Hungary 4118.63 92-96 1.99 0.53 3.75 8.7Ireland 18113.39 90-99 2.74 0.68 1 7.8Italy 19945.11 90-96 0.54 0.3 2 8.33Japan 33651.12 90-99 0.22 0.27 2 8.98Korea 9080.7 90-98 0.17 0.37 3 5.35Netherlands 23428.67 90-99 1.3 0.81 2 10New Zealand 14610.86 93-98 3.67 0.7 4 10Norway 31566.23 90-98 1.83 0.61 2 10Peru 1830.52 93-99 0.05 0.64 0 2.5Poland 3086.95 90-96 0.23 0.57 2.25 8.7Portugal 9898.75 91-99 0.08 0.46 1 8.68Russia 1794.24 95-98 0.31 0.43 2.5 3.7Singapore 19833.44 90-99 3.06 0.85 4 8.57South Afria 3421.53 90-99 4.62 0.78 4 4.42Spain 14318.88 90-99 0.02 0.54 1 7.8Sweden 27737.36 90-99 7.61 0.78 2 10Switzerland 36740.73 90-98 3.33 0.77 1 10Thailand 2180.28 90-99 0.12 0.66 4 6.25Turkey 2912.32 98-99 0.86 0.55 2 5.18United Kingdom 20134.59 92-98 1.85 0.47 4 8.57United States 27608.5 90-99 3.65 0.2 1 10
87
The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of bankrupties to the number of rms(LIQ.). LAGGDP is the 1-period lagged logarithm of GDP per apita, LAGGROWTHis 1-year lagged real GDP growth, RULE OF LAW is a measure in interval from 0 to 10(La Porta et al. (1997)), CREDITOR is measure of CREDITOR'S PROTECTION indexfrom 1 to 4 (La Porta et al. (1997)), INTERACTION is the interation term betweenCREDITOR and RULE OF LAW, BANKCONC on the banking market measured as ashare of assets of three largest bank on the total sum of assets. RULE5 is the dummyvariable equal to 1, if RULE OF LAW>5, RULE8 is the dummy variable equal to 1,if RULE OF LAW>8. INTER5 (INTER8) are the interation term between RULE5(RULE8) and CREDITOR.Table 3.2: Estimation results : Liquidation rate(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Constant -2.928** -4.160*** -7.495*** -8.353*** -6.939***(2.40) (4.37) (6.62) (10.28) (5.89)Lag GROWTH -3.306** -2.672** -2.384** -2.078** -2.021*(2.38) (2.42) (2.20) (2.25) (1.86)Lag GDP 0.355** 0.420*** 0.579*** 0.850*** 0.575***(2.44) (3.55) (4.41) (9.92) (4.90)Creditor -0.136 -0.122 1.292*** 1.236*** 0.514***(1.52) (1.39) (3.73) (9.43) (3.22)Rule of Law 0.206*** 0.077 0.300***(2.88) (1.08) (4.59)Bank Con. 2.506*** 2.997*** 2.569*** 2.939***(4.95) (6.01) (5.90) (6.04)Interation -0.182***(4.30)Rule8 1.856***(4.85)Inter8 -0.921***(4.76)Rule5 0.728***(2.68)Inter5 -1.566***(10.04)Year eet yes yes yes yes yesCountry eet no no no no noObservations 271 257 257 257 257
R2 0.19 0.27 0.36 0.50 0.34F statistis: 4.77 8.50 11.91 22.44 13.33Robust t statistis in parentheses* signiant at 10%; ** signiant at 5%; *** signiant at 1%The results of year dummies are not reported88
The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of bankrupties to the number of rms(LIQ.) LAGGDP is the 1-period lagged logarithm of GDP per apita, LAGGROWTHis 1-year lagged real GDP growth. RULE OF LAW is a measure in interval from 0 to10 (La Porta et al. (1997)), CREDITOR is measure of CREDITOR'S PROTECTIONindex from 1 to 4 (La Porta et al. (1997)), INTERACTION is the interation termbetween CREDITOR and RULE OF LAW, BANKCONC on the banking market mea-sured as a share of assets of three largest bank on the total sum of assets. FRENCH,GERMAN, TRANSITION, COMMON, SCANDINAVIAN are dummies indiating legalorigin (La Porta et al. (1997)). Private Credit measures private redits by deposit moneybanks in ration to GDP.Table 3.3: Estimation results : Liquidation rate(6) (7) (8) (9)Constant -5.915*** -6.799*** -4.380** -0.956(4.17) (4.82) (2.14) (0.47)Lag ROWTH -2.879*** -2.287** -1.355*** -0.615*(2.87) (2.31) (4.17) (1.82)Lag GDP 0.689*** 0.708*** 0.529** 0.029(4.20) (4.31) (2.56) (0.13)Bank Con. 1.656*** 2.350*** 0.645* 0.925***(3.78) (5.93) (1.73) (2.58)Rule of Law -0.059 0.129*(0.93) (1.93)Frenh -0.028 -0.482**(0.13) (2.36)Common 1.599*** 1.405***(7.04) (7.20)Sandinavian 0.986*** 0.633**(2.95) (2.07)Transition 1.080*** 0.411(3.05) (1.07)Creditor 0.531* 0.333** 0.186(1.92) (2.12) (1.24)Interation -0.117***(3.43)Private Credit 1.981***(4.66)Year eet yes yes yes yesCountry eet no no yes yesObservations 257 257 257 249
R2 0.44 0.53 0.11 0.18F statistis: 23.84 25.77Number of ountries 35 34Robust t statistis in parentheses* signiant at 10%; ** signiant at 5%; *** signiant at 1%The results of year dummies are not reported89
Chapter 4
How Does the Bankrupty LawInuene a Lender's Deision onInformation Sharing?
4.1 IntrodutionThe redit markets are aeted by asymmetri information between lenders andborrowers. There are two basi views how lenders an redue the problem ofasymmetri information. Aording to the rst view, power given to the reditorby bankrupty laws matters and an redue the moral hazard problem. If thereditor an more easily enfore repayment, ask for the ollateral or threaten withliquidation he is more willing to provide redits. This power theory approahwas studied by Townsend (1979), Aghion et al. (1992), Aghion and Bolton (1992)and Hart (2000). Aording to the seond view, lenders an fous on the typeof asymmetri information that gives rise to the problem of adverse seletion.The reditor an solve the problem of information asymmetry by investing insreening, monitoring (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Jaee and Russell (1976)),or obtaining the information about the debtors from other reditors (Jappelli and90
Pagano, 1993). Djankov et al. (2005) and Jappelli and Pagano (2002) providesome empirial evidene that the informational and reditor power approahesmight be substitutes.1 Some ountries may speialize on information institutions,others on laws giving more power to the reditors.In this hapter, we fous on the determinants of institutions to share infor-mation. We observe the emergene of institutions for the information exhangeamong lenders around the world, whih are alled private redit bureaus. Thesebureaus, working on the priniple of reiproity, distribute information suppliedvoluntarily by bureau members (reditors). In reent models on information ex-hange (Jappelli and Pagano (1993), Gehrig and Stenbaka (2001)) information ismore likely to be shared in less ompetitive banking environments. These models,however, do not take into aount the eet of reditor rights protetion.We study how two dierent approahes of informational and power theoriesinterat with eah other. We ask how a bank's deision to share information isinuened by a government's deision on the reditor rights protetion and howthis is aeted by dierent degrees of bank ompetition in redit markets. Wepresent a two period model with moral hazard and adverse seletion, where thedeisions on information sharing and bankrupty law arise endogenously. Consid-ering the eet of bankrupty law hosen by the government, we nd that thereexists a parameter spae, where information sharing is more likely to take plaein more ompetitive markets.The main idea of the model is following. We ompare two senarios of monop-olisti and ompetitive redit market. The monopolisti reditor an extrat thewhole rent from the rm. However, then the manager does not have any inen-tives to exert eort. If the bankrupty law protets the reditor rights eetively,the reditor an easily punish the manager in the ase of failure and this makes1Manove et al. (2001) analyze the problem of ollateral versus sreening in the adverse sele-tion model. The ollateral represents the reditor power theories and sreening is an informationtheory approah. They nd that these instruments might be substitutes and to extensive red-itors right protetion might lead to ineiently low sreening.91
eort heaper to implement. In the ompetitive market, however, the reditorsompete and drive the prie to the ost of apital. As the prie of the redit islower, the rm is left with a higher share of the surplus and therefore the managerhas higher inentives to exert eort. In the ompetitive market, even without thelaw, high eort might be an optimal hoie and the government does not have toenourage the eort by the tough law that also auses liquidation osts. If thegovernment as a soial maximizer is interested in implementation of eort, it hasmore inentives to introdue bankrupty law in ase of monopoly market.Bankrupty laws might not only redue the moral hazard problem but also anwork as a substitute to information sharing, solving the adverse seletion problem.As the bankrupty laws allow the bank to liquidate unsuessful rms, low abilityrms do not apply for the redit at the rst plae and leave the redit market.They know that their rms would be liquidated with ertainty. Banks in a mo-nopolisti redit market, where tough bankrupty law was implemented then loseinentives to share information. The banks in a more ompetitive environment,where the government does not have suh inentives to implement tough reditorprotetion, might be still willing to share information. Then, we might observemonopoly market without information sharing and ompetitive market where thebanks use information sharing.We provide also empirial evidene on the determinants of information sharing.Using a ross ountry database we nd that information sharing is more prevalentin ountries with more intensive ompetition in the redit market. We also ndthat private information sharing is less used in ountries with Frenh and ountrieswith former soialisti legal system. However, we do not nd evidene for asubstitution eet between information sharing and the reditor rights protetion.The hapter proeeds as follows. Setion 4.2 presents a review of the existingliterature on information sharing and reditor rights protetion. In Setion 4.3 weintrodue the model and disuss two senarios of bank ompetition. The hoie ofthe optimal bankrupty law and bank's deision to share information are desribed92
in setion 4.4. Setion 4.5 provides empirial evidene and setion 4.6 summarizesour ndings.4.2 Literature reviewTheory Information sharing about borrowers' harateristis an have impor-tant eets on the redit market. Jappelli and Pagano (2000) provide an overviewof theoretial studies and emphasize several important eets of information shar-ing. First, information sharing improves the banks' knowledge about redit appli-ants and might help to solve the adverse seletion problem in the redit market.This eet is studied in a pure adverse seletion model by Jappelli and Pagano(1993). If banks exhange information about their borrowers, they an then iden-tify reditworthiness of redit appliants that have moved into the banks' marketareas. Given the better information, the banks an lend to these new lients assafely as they lend to their long-standing lients and the default rate dereases.Jappelli and Pagano (1993) nd in that setting that bank ompetition has a neg-ative eet on the lenders inentives to establish a redit bureau. Bank ompeti-tion disourages from information sharing as the bank that provides informationabout its lients to its ompetitors enable these ompetitors to ompete moreaggressively. If there are signiant barriers that limit ompetition, banks arenot threatened by intensive ompetition if they provide information and they aremore likely to share.Two other important eets of information sharing are studied by Padillaand Pagano (1997) and Padilla and Pagano (2000). They stress the informationsharing eet on manager's inentives. Padilla and Pagano (1997) argue thatthe information advantage that banks obtain from long-relationships with rmsprodues a hold-up problem: borrowers antiipate that the banks will extrat thewhole surplus in future and they exert low eort to perform. By informationsharing banks an ommit to redue their information rents and leave a larger93
portion of the surplus generated by the projet to the entrepreneur giving himmore inentives to exert eort. Padilla and Pagano (2000) fous on the disiplinaryeet of information sharing. Information about defaults shared by banks is a badsignal about the rm's quality. Firms are trying to avoid the default by exertingmore eort beause this signal is assoiated with higher interest rates.In the reent literature we nd studies that take into aount bank ompetitionbefore the banks aquire the information advantage and nd that informationsharing an be onsidered as a ollusive devie of banks. Boukaert and Degryse(2004) study a duopoly banking market and nd that the bank has an inentive todislose some information about its lients in order to inuene the rival's entry.2Gehrig and Stenbaka (2001) analyze a model with repeated bank ompetitionand swithing osts. The banks enhane their prots using information sharingto relax ompetition in the rst period.3Empirial studies There is a growing empirial literature on information shar-ing. Jappelli and Pagano (2002) study how information sharing inuenes lendingand the number of defaults. They nd that information sharing is assoiated withhigher bank lending and lower redit risk. Djankov et al. (2005) study the de-terminants of the size of redit markets in 129 ountries. They nd that theexistene of information sharing institutions is related to higher ratios of privateredit to GDP. They also nd that legal origin is an important determinant of theemergene of information sharing institutions. Both studies (Jappelli and Pagano(2002), Djankov et al. (2005)) suggest that information sharing institutions andreditor protetion rights may be substitutes, i.e. some ountries fous on the in-2The inumbent bank, by displaying information about its high ability lients, makes itunattrative for the entrant to serve other high ability borrowers as these are pooled with alarge portion of bad borrowers. This redues the extent of rival's entry.3Without information sharing, banks ompete intensively in rst periods of ompetition toexpand their redit portfolio to be able to extrat the information rent in the next period.However, information sharing relaxes the ompetition in the rst period and this enhanesprots of banks. Therefore, information sharing an be onsider as a ollusive devie banks useto inrease their prots. 94
formation hannel others rather rely on power theories and give substantial rightsto reditors. Aording to Djankov et al. (2005), the existene of private registriesis more prevalent in rih ountries as well as in ountries with ommon law andSandinavian legal origin.Bankrupty laws Creditor protetion rights are usually expressed in the formof bankrupty laws. The bankrupty law an be soft or tough on the debtor.The tough bankrupty law means that reditor rights are well proteted and thereditor an easily take possession of the rm's assets and liquidate the rm. Thesoft bankrupty law protets more the rights of the debtor and for the reditor itis more diult to aess the ollateral. The reditor is disouraged by the softbankrupty law from starting a liquidation proedure and various kinds of out-of-ourt negotiations are more likely to be used (reorganization, debt renaninget.).4There exist also many studies analyzing the inentives reated by the toughbankrupty law on the deisions made by debtor and reditor. Our model of bank-rupty law is based on Biais and Mariotti (2003). They analyze how bankruptylaws inuene manager's inentives to exert eort in a general equilibrium modeland nd that a soft bankrupty law is favored by relatively rih agents, who arenot threatened by redit rationing.Hainz (2004) nds in her model of redit markets and quality of institutions(bankrupty laws) that the bank's deision to liquidated bad rms has two eet.First, the bank reeives a payo in ase of liquidation. Seond, liquidating theunsuessful rm reveals the information about the borrower's type and the bankloses rent from inumbent ustomers due to the informational advantage. She4An example of the soft bankrupty is a law that gives a lot disretion power to the judge andthe judge, onsidering the soial osts of liquidation, is then more likely to rejet the bankruptyproedure. In ontrast, an example of the tough bankrupty law is automati trigger provision.An automati trigger provision does not allow for any disretion of the judge and automatiallystarts the liquidation proedure if the rm is insolvent. It was implemented for example inHungary 1991-1992 (Janda, 2004). 95
shows that institutions must improve signiantly to obtain the optimal numberof liquidations.Many studies have shown the importane of the reditor rights protetion forthe development of redit markets (e.g. Djankov et al. (2005), La Porta et al.(1997)). However, the quality of reditor protetion does not depend only onthe law itself but also on its enforement. Pistor et al. (2000) and Pistor (2000)nd that in transition ountries the judiial eieny is a better preditor for theredit market size than the quality of reditor protetion.4.3 ModelFirmsOur model is a two-period model of the redit market. We assume that only oneperiod ontrats are available as in the rms might migrate among ities in theseond period (see below). The model is based on the adverse seletion model ofJappelli and Pagano (1993) and on the moral hazard model of Padilla and Pagano(1997). We onsider a ountry with N towns, N ≥ 3. Eah town onsists of aontinuum of rms uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. All rms have aninvestment projet with osts I and dier with respet to their protability. Thereare q good (high ability) rms and 1 − q bad (low ability) rms. The projetin the good rm is suessful and earns R with probability ph if the entrepreneurin the rm exerts eort and earns 0 with probability 1−ph. The eort osts are e.The probability of suess of a projet in a good rm if the entrepreneur does notexert eort is pl (ph > pl), the projet fails with probability 1− pl. All projets inbad rms are unsuessful with ertainty. The eort hosen in the rst period isnot observable and determines the outome of the projet in both periods, i.e. inthe seond period the manager does not exert any eort. The rm does not knowits type in the rst period, it realizes its type in the seond period.96
Banks and information sharingIn eah town there is one bank. Firms do not have any internal funds, they have toborrow the funds from a bank to over the osts of the projet I. If the projet issuessful, the entrepreneur is supposed to pay bak the endogenously determinedprie of the redit T 1 and T 2 at the end of the rst and seond period respetively.The bank, like the rm, does not know the type of the rm in the rst period.In the seond period, the bank observes ostlessly the type of the rms to whihit provided a redit in the rst period. In the seond period, eah bank faesa turnover in its ustomer base as a portion m of the rms in the town movesexogenously to another town and is replaed by the same portion of immigrantsfrom other towns. The banks learn the type of their old lients that stay in thetown (residents), however, the migrants from other towns are a blak box, thebank does not know the type of migrant rms.The banks an share information about the migrants in the seond period.Sharing information means that all banks in the ountry agree to set up a reditbureau. The bureau merges the information provided by all banks into a singledatabase and all banks get the information about the type of the migrant rms,whih solves the problem of adverse seletion produed by the asymmetri in-formation and migration in the seond period.5 We assume that in the seondperiod as the rms realize their type, the bad type rms an apply for multipleredits in all banks ostlessly. They know they are not going to pay bak theredit and they just want to enjoy the utility from being in business. This impliesthat the adverse seletion problem in the seond period is so severe that a bankannot serve lients without information on their type. This is a strong assump-tion, however, it emphasizes the idea of information sharing. On the one hand, in5This information sharing design is motivated by the desription of redit bureaus aroundthe world. A viable information sharing agreement has to take into aount that banks ex-posthave inentives to heat by not reporting or misreporting information about its good ustomers.The agreement usually prevent suh behavior by private enforement mehanism. Wheneverthe bank behaves opportunistially it is punished by exlusion from the redit bureau (Jappelliand Pagano, 1993), (Padilla and Pagano, 1997).97
ase of information sharing the banks derease their losses aused by naning oflow ability rms but have to fae tougher ompetition and hene lower prots onthe high ability rms. On the other hand, without information sharing the bankan extrat some rent from the rms by whih the bank posses better informationompare to the ompetitors but faes larger losses by rms without information.Bank ompetitionThe ompetition in the banking setor is analyzed in two senarios. In setion4.3.1, we onsider the ase when serving lients in another town is prohibitivelyexpensive and the loal bank enjoys a monopoly power. Seond, in setion 4.3.2we fous on a ompetitive environment that is modeled in the following way: Weassume that banks an serve rms in neighboring towns at additional transporta-tion osts c that reet their lower eieny in ompeting outside their marketarea. We assume that migrant rms hanging their loation in the seond periodmove to distant towns, so that their former bank annot keep them as ustomers(osts of extending redit to rms in distant towns are prohibitively high as inthe monopoly ase). There are several regions in the ountry and the bank anompete for the lients only within the one region, while the migrants move arossthe region borders. This assumption assures that the migrant's type is unknownfor the loal bank as well as for the potential ompetitor in the region (Jappelliand Pagano, 1993).Bankrupty lawsThe government takes a deision on bankrupty law that allows the bank toliquidate an unsuessful rm. If the rm is liquidated the bank beomes theliquidation value L and the manager loses his private benet B. For simpliitywe assume B = L. Liquidation of a rm produes soial osts of liquidation U .66This an be justied as ost of unemployment benets, disturbed soial environment in theity et. More detail motivation an be found in (Tirole, 2001).98
The bankrupty law is modeled in a very simple way. The bankrupty law isonsidered to be a disrete variable; if α = 1 the bank an liquidate the rm andgets the liquidation value, if α = 0 the bank annot liquidate the rm.We assume, in the same way as Padilla and Pagano (1997), that eah individualinvestment is run as a limited liability ompany and that the entrepreneur annotbe disqualied after the default from future investments. If the projet fails, theentrepreneur annot be held liable for the loss and his future investments are freeof harge and he is not disqualied from future new investments.TimingThe timing of the game is as follows:Period 0 The government hooses the bankrupty law α.Period 1 Banks set pries and ompete for lients. The entrepreneur hooseseort, the eort hosen in the period 1 determines the outome of the projet inperiod 1 as well as in period 2 (Padilla and Pagano, 1997). Then the returns arerealized, suessful rms pay bak the redit, while unsuessful do not and theyare liquidated or not.Period 2 Banks and the entrepreneur himself learn the type of the entrepreneur.The probability of suess of the projet is determined by the eort exerted alreadyin period 1. A portion of m rms hanges exogenously loation from one town toanother. Banks an deide whether to share information about the rms. Banksset pries and ompete for lients. The payos are realized.We solve the model by bakward indution. We onsider two ases, rst themonopolisti ase, where the bank is a monopolist in the town and then we on-sider the ase with ompetition in the redit market.99
4.3.1 Monopoly in the banking marketWe study the ase of monopoly in the redit market and we assume that the ostsof serving the ustomers in other towns are prohibitively high. For the deisionsin the banking market we have to onsider the bankrupty law as given as thiswas determined in period 0. We analyze in turn the ases of a soft and a toughbankrupty law.Soft bankrupty lawThe seond period We start our analysis in the seond period in whih thebankrupty law is taken as given. If the government implements the soft bank-rupty law in period 0, the bank annot liquidate an unsuessful rm. There isno moral hazard problem in the seond period as eort has been exerted alreadyin the rst period, the eort level is taken as given. The banks realize the type ofrms in their portfolio. A portion of m rms hanges loation to distant towns.The banks in the seond period an deide whether to share information ornot. On the one hand, information sharing brings an advantage in reduing theproblem of adverse seletion. On the other hand, when a bank supplies informa-tion about its ustomers to a ompetitor, in eet it enourages more aggressiveompetition. In the ase of monopoly when banks annot ompete for the lientsin the neighboring towns even after information sharing was introdued, thereare no disadvantages of information sharing and monopolisti banks always haveinentives to share information.The monopolisti bank thus solves the problem of adverse seletion in theseond period by exhanging the information about all lients. Then the bankan serve only good type entrepreneurs and harge them monopolisti pries. Wehave to onsider two ases in whih low or high eort was exerted, respetively.The rm has to pay bak the prie of the redit T2; the rm's partiipation100
onstraint in the seond period is:
pi(R + B − T
2
i ) + (1 − pi)B ≥ 0, i = h, l (4.1)The bank as a monopolist makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer and makes the partii-pation onstraint of the rm binding, extrating the whole surplus of the projet.This determines the prie of the redit in the seond period for the ase of thesoft bankrupty law
T 2i = R +
B
pi
, i = h, l (4.2)The rst period In the this period, the moral hazard problem arises. Themonopoly bank has two options. It an either harge the prie that extrats thewhole surplus of the projet. Suh a ontrat does not give inentives to theentrepreneur to exert any eort. The seond option is that the bank an take intoaount the entrepreneur's inentive ompatibility onstraint and ask for higheort.The rm in the rst period is a high ability rm with probability q. Withprobability 1 − q the rm is a low ability rm and fails in performing the projetwith ertainty. As in the seond period information sharing eliminates the lowability rms from the redit market, they are naned only in the rst period.The inentive onstraint of the rm an be then written as:
q[ph(R + B − T
1
h ) + (1 − ph)B + ph(R + B − E[T
2
h ]) + (1 − ph)B] + (1 − q)B − e ≥
q[pl(R + B − T
1
l ) + (1 − pl)B + pl(R + B − E[T
2
l ]) + (1 − pl)B] + (1 − q)B
T < T 1h ≡ R −
e
q(ph − pl)
(4.3)101
This means that if the bank wants to make the entrepreneur exert high eort,the prie of the redit in the rst period annot be larger than T 1h (expression(4.3)). However, if the low eort ase is also protable, the bank an extrat thewhole surplus from the rm, i.e. it makes the partiipation onstraint for the loweort binding and harges the prie T 1l (expression (4.4)).
q[pl(R + B − T
1
l ) + (1 − pl)B + pl(R + B − E[T
2
l ]) + (1 − pl)B] + (1 − q)B ≥ 0
T 1l = R +
B
qpl
(4.4)To ompare the bank's options of induing the high or low eort we onsiderthe bank's prot in both ases.Proposition 4.1. Under the soft bankrupty law (α = 0) the monopolisti bankprefers the entrepreneur to exert the high eort if the eort osts are suientlylow; e < eM , where
e > eM =
(ph − pl)(2(ph − pl)qR − B)
ph
(4.5)Proof. See AppendixThe bank as a monopolist makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer and an deide, byhoosing the appropriate ontrat, whih eort level will be exert by the entrepre-neur. Clearly, the bank prefers the high eort if osts of exerting eort are low orthe reward for the high eort (ph − pl) is high. If the osts of eort are high it ismore protable to extrat the whole surplus of the projet from the rm and letthe entrepreneur exert the low eort.
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Tough bankrupty lawIf the government implements the tough bankrupty law in period 0, banks areallowed to punish unsuessful entrepreneurs by liquidation. The tough bank-rupty law an work as a substitute to information sharing. In the seond period,when the rms realize their own types, the bad rms are sure about their failure.The bad rms would apply for a redit knowing that they are not going to paybak the redit and the entrepreneurs just want to enjoy the private benets ofbeing in oe. However, if the bank an liquidate the unsuessful rm, this isgoing to disourage bad type rms from appliation and they leave the reditmarket. Therefore, there is no adverse seletion problem in the seond periodunder the tough bankrupty law and the monopolisti banks do not need to shareinformation to keep the bad rms out of the market.7In our analysis we proeed in the similar way as in the soft bankrupty lawase, only the dierene is that the bank an liquidate the rm and beomes theliquidation value L, while the manager loses private benet B. This happens withprobability 1 − pi, i = h, l.The seond period In the seond period banks realize the type of their lientsand a portion of m rms in their portfolios hanges loation to distant towns.Due to the tough bankrupty law, the low ability migrant rms leave the marketand the bank will serve only the high ability rms: loal residents and migrants.The rm's partiipation onstraint is:
pi(R + B − T
2
i ) ≥ 0, i = h, l (4.6)The bank as a monopolist makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the rm and derivesthe prie of the redit from the binding rm's partiipation onstraint. This7If we assume just small ost of ǫ to set up the redit bureau to exhange information, bankswill not have any inentives to inur these osts under the tough bankrupty law.103
implies the prie of the redit equals to
T 2i = R + B, i = h, l (4.7)Similar as in the ase of the soft bankrupty law, the bank extrats the wholesurplus of the projet. There is no moral hazard problem beause the eort wasexerted in the rst period and eort osts are sunk in the seond period.The rst period The bank has again two options: (i) to extrat the wholesurplus and aept low eort or (ii) to fulll the inentive onstraint of the entre-preneur and ask for high eort. The inentive onstraint of the rm is:
q[ph(R + B − T
1
h ) + ph(R + B − E[T
2
h ])] − e ≥
q[pl(R + B − T
1
h ) + pl(R + B − E[T
2
l ])]
T < T 1h = R + B −
e
q(ph − pl)
(4.8)The bank an harge a higher prie to indue the high eort ompare to the softlaw ase if the expression (4.8) is larger than the expression (4.3)). If the managerhooses the low eort, the bank an extrat the whole surplus from the rm, i.e.it makes the partiipation onstraint for the low eort binding:
q[pl(R + B − T
1
h ) + pl(R + B − E[T
2
l ])] = 0 (4.9)
T 1l = R + B (4.10)Proposition 4.2. Under tough bankrupty law (α = 1) the monopolisti bankprefers the entrepreneur to exert the high eort if the eort osts are suiently
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low; e < eM , where
e > eM =
2(ph − pl)
2qR
ph
(4.11)Proof. See AppendixThe introdution of the bankrupty law allows the bank to punish the entre-preneur in the bad state of the world and this makes the implementation of higheort less expensive. Comparing the soft and tough bankrupty law ases it iseasy to show that eM is smaller than eM . This implies that if the osts of eortare smaller than eM , the high eort is hosen under the soft as well as under thetough law. If the eort osts lie in the interval [eM , eM ] then the high eort isexerted only in the ase of the tough bankrupty law. Finally, if e > eM , the eortosts are too high for the soft as well as the tough bankrupty law and in bothases the low eort is exerted.4.3.2 Competition in the banking marketIn this senario we allow for ompetition among banks from dierent towns. Theentrant bank from a foreign town faes a ost disadvantage c. The banks ompetesimultaneously announing the prie of the redit maximizing its prot. To breakties, the rm is assumed to prefer the loal bank if the oered interest rates areequal.Seond Period In the seond period, banks realize the type of their lients anda portion of m rms migrate to distant town. The bank has to deide whether toshare information or not. To analyze the bank's deision we ompare its protsunder both senarios.
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No information sharingWithout information sharing the loal and the foreign bank have the same in-formation about migrants. Due to the problem of adverse seletion that arisesin the seond period, banks annot serve rms without information about theirtypes. The loal bank an sort out migrants and old residents and an hargethe monopoly prie to the good-type residents and not serve the bad types. Thebank from the other town annot distinguish among migrants and old residentsand therefore annot serve lients in the distant town.If the bank behaves as a monopolist, it makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the
(1 − m)q good residents and makes the partiipation onstraint of the residentsbinding. This implies the prie of the redit being T 2i , i = h, l, depending on theeort exerted in the rst period.
T 2i = R +
B
pi
, i = h, lThe bank's payo in the seond period is then:
ΠNS = (1 − m)(q(pi(R +
B
pi
− I), i = h, l (4.12)Information sharingIf the banks deide to share information about their lients in the seond periodthey beome ompetitors. The potential entrant oers the lowest possible prietaking into aount the transportation ost c. With information sharing, thepartiipation onstraint of the entrant beomes:
Πe = q(piT
2
i − I − c) ≥ 0, i = h, lThe loal bank an always oer the same prie as the entrant and in the equi-librium the rm deides to take the redit from the loal bank. The equilibrium106
ompetition prie harged by the loal bank is then:
T 2i =
I + c
pi
, i = h, l (4.13)The bank's payo in the seond period with information sharing is:
ΠIS = q(pi
I + c
pi
− I) = qc, i = h, l (4.14)Now we ompare the bank's prot in the seond period without information shar-ing (4.12) with the ase of information sharing (4.14). The bank's deision oninformation sharing is summarized in the following lemma.Lemma 4.1. The banks share information about the type of the rm in the seondperiod if the transportation osts are high enough;
c > cmin = (1 − m)(piR + B − I), i = h, lIf the osts c are large enough (c > cmin = (1 − m)(piR + B − I)) the bankprefers information sharing. If c is smaller than cmin it is more protable notto share. Clearly the higher the number of migrants the lower are the minimaltransportation osts cmin. It follows that the ondition for information sharingin the ase when the high eort was exerted in the rst period is c > cminH =
(1−m)(phR + B − I). If the ondition holds for the high eort, it is also fullledfor the low eort ase as ph > pl.If there is perfet ompetition in the redit market (c = 0), banks an hooseeither not to share information, whih allow them to serve only old ustomersand harge them monopoly pries or to exhange information and serving alllients. However, in the perfet ompetition environment, banks do not haveany inentives to start information sharing in the seond period. If they shareinformation, Bertrand prie ompetition drives the prots down to zero. It islear that it is always better to serve only old ustomers and to harge them107
monopoly pries. For brevity we onentrate from now on the situation where
c > cmin.First Period In the rst period all banks have the same information aboutrms and the only dierene is the transportation ost disadvantage c. In therst period the entrant's payo is:
Πe = q(piT
1
i + piE[T
2
i ] − 2I − c) − (1 − q)I − c, i = h, lMaking the partiipation onstraint binding, it follows that the ompetitive priethe loal bank oers in the rst period is T 1i = I+cqpi , i = h, l.Competition in the rst period only takes plae if the transportation osts arenot too high, so that the prie oered by the entrant is still aeptable for therm. The partiipation onstraint of the rm in the ase when high eort wasexerted is:
Πfirm = q[ph(R + B − T
1
h ) + 2(1 − ph)B
+ ph(R + B − E[T
2
h ])] + (1 − q)B ≥ 0 (4.15)Taking into aount the ompetitive pries T 1h and T 2h , the expression (4.15) islarger or equal to zero for c ≤ cM ≡ 2phqR−e1+q +B−I. For c ≤ cM the transportationosts are not high enough to reate a monopolisti situation and ompetitionamong banks takes plae.8Given the ompetitive pries in the rst and seond period we determine theeort the entrepreneur is going to exert in the rst period:Proposition 4.3. Under the tough bankrupty law (α = 1) and in a perfetompetitive market, the entrepreneur exerts the high eort in the rst period if the8If the transportation osts c are lower than cM this is enough to enourage ompetition inthe seond period as well as the maximum osts still ensuring ompetition in the seond period
cM2 = phR + B − I are larger than cM . 108
eort osts are suiently low; e < eC, where
eC =
2(ph − pl)
2qR
ph
(4.16)Proof. See AppendixMaximum eort osts that still ensure that the manager exerts high eortin the ompetition environment (eC) is higher than the maximum eort in themonopoly ase (eM) as
eC − eM =
(ph − pl)q(B + 2plR)
ph
> 0We onentrate on the ase when e < eC , thus in the ase of ompetition inthe redit market high eort is exerted in the rst period and the government hasno inentives to adopt the tough bankrupty law. In other words, the ompetitionamong banks drives the prie of the redit low enough and leaves the entrepreneurwith a larger share of the projet return enouraging the high eort. We fous atthis parameter spae to emphasize the dierene between the monopoly ase andthe ompetition ase with respet to the government's deision on the bankruptylaw. The hoie of the optimal bankrupty law is analyzed in the next setion.4.4 Optimal bankrupty lawThe government hooses the bankrupty law to maximize the soial welfare. Thesoial welfare is dened as the sum of payos of all players minus the potentialliquidation osts U . Competition in the banking market inuenes diretly thepries of the redit, but from the soial point of view it is more important thatompetition inuenes the eort exerted by the manager. The government islearly interested in the high eort whih brings a higher soial welfare and wouldlike to avoid liquidation osts U . In the ase of ompetition in the redit market,109
the government does not have any inentives to implement a tough bankruptylaw if the the ompetition is intensive enough to ensure the high eort.However, in the ase of a bank monopoly, if the eort osts lie in the interval
[eM , eM ] the government might want to enourage the high eort even though thetough bankrupty law would ause liquidation osts. The soial planner omparessoial welfare under the tough law with liquidation osts and high eort (4.17) andsoial welfare under the soft law with low eort without liquidation osts (4.18).
SWtough = q[2ph(R + B) − 2(1 − ph)U − 2I] − (1 − q)(U + I) − e (4.17)
SWsoft = q(2pl(R + B) + 2(1 − pl)B) − 2I) + (1 − q)(B − I) (4.18)Proposition 4.4. The government hooses tough bankrupty law in the ase ofmonopoly market if the eort osts lie in the interval [eM , eM ] and the liquidationosts are small enough:
U < Umax =
2(ph − pl)qR − (1 + q − 2ph)B − e
1 + q − 2ph
Proof. The proposition follows diretly from omparing the government's payosin the ase of monopoly for the tough and soft bankrupty laws. SWtough is largerthan SWsoft if the liquidation osts are relatively small, i.e. U < Umax.For eort osts lower than eM the government implements the soft bankruptylaw beause the tough law is not neessary to enourage the high eort and wouldonly ause soially ineient liquidation. If the eort osts are higher than eM ,even the tough bankrupty law does not enourage the high eort and again wouldonly ause liquidation osts. The government might be interested in adopting thetough bankrupty law to promote the high eort if eort osts lie in the interval110
of [eM , eM ]. However, this is the ase only if the liquidation osts indued by thetough bankrupty law are more than overweighed by the improvement in eienydue to the exerted eort.If the tough bankrupty law is implemented, no information sharing is nees-sary. For the eort osts in the interval e < eC , the government does not haveany inentives to implement the tough bankrupty law in the ase of ompetitionas the high eort is exerted even under soft bankrupty law. If ompetition islimited enough (c > cmin) then banks use information sharing in the ase of softbankrupty law.Proposition 4.4 is the entral result of our analysis. We have shown thatthere exists a parameter spae, where tougher ompetition is assoiated withinformation sharing. This result is driven by the government's deision on thebankrupty law. Adopting the tough bankrupty law the government might wantto solve the moral hazard problem in the rst period and to enourage high eortlevels in the monopoly banking market. The introdution of the tough bankruptylaw has side eets as it solves the adverse seletion problem. The solution ofthe adverse seletion aused that monopolisti banks do not need to exhangeinformation. In ontrast, in a ompetitive banking market, the government doesnot have suh strong inentives to implement a tough bankrupty law. In theabsene of the tough bankrupty law banks have to deal with the problem ofadverse seletion. Banks then have inentives to share information, neverthelessonly in the ase when information sharing does not destroy their prots due tothe inreased ompetition.The results are summarized in Figure 4.1. In a ompetitive environment,banks agree to share information only if transportation osts are high enough toensure them suient prots (c > cmin). If ompetition beomes more intensive(c < cmin) the banks lose inentives to share information. This result is onsistentwith Jappelli and Pagano (1993). If the transportation osts are higher than
cM (i.e. degree of ompetition is lower) banks enjoy monopolisti power and the111
government might want to introdue the tough bankrupty law. If the eort ostslie in the interval [eM , eM ] the tough bankrupty law then leads to an absene ofinformation sharing in a monopolisti redit market.
Figure 4.1: Information sharing and the bankrupty law
4.5 Empirial evideneOur theoretial model predits that there exists a parameter spae, where thetough ompetition in the redit market is assoiated with a higher probability ofinformation sharing. Other theoretial models suh as Jappelli and Pagano (1993),Gehrig and Stenbaka (2001) and Boukaert and Degryse (2004) predit that moreintensive ompetition should be assoiated with less information sharing. In thisempirial setion we would like to ompare theoretial preditions with empirialevidene. We estimate a basi model analyzing the determinants of the existeneof private institutions to exhange information (private bureaus).4.5.1 DataIn our analysis we ombine several databases. The nal database ontains dataon 104 ountries around the world. The data on private redit bureaus are ol-112
leted from the World Bank Doing Business Database.9 The variable BUREAUCOVERAGE is dened as a perentage of the adult population that is listed bythe private redit bureau with urrent information on repayment history, unpaiddebts or redit outstanding.10 If no private bureau operates, the overage valueis zero.In our analysis we ontrol for the existene of the publi redit registry withthe variable REGISTRY COVERAGE. The variable is also reported in the WorldBank Doing Business Database and measures the share of adult population ov-ered by the publi redit registry.11As a proxy to measure the degree of ompetition on the redit market we usethe variable BANK CONCENTRATION. The bank onentration is alulated asthe sum of assets of three largest banks to total assets of all ommerial banks inthe ountry and is taken from the Fith's BankSope database and are available foryears 1990-2002.12 The reditor rights index (CREDITOR) is a proxy to measurethe toughness of the bankrupty law. The index is onstruted by La Porta et al.(1997). The latest results for year 2002 are reported in the study of Djankovet al. (2005). The index measures the power of seured lenders on sale from0 (weak protetion) to 4 (strong reditor protetion). To ontrol for the size ofthe redit market we use the measure of the share of private redit by depositmoney banks to GDP (PRIVATE CREDIT).13 Other ontrol variables inlude9http://www.doingbusiness.org/ The Doing Business database provides objetive measuresof business regulations and their enforement. The Doing Business indiators are omparableaross 155 eonomies. They indiate the regulatory osts of business and an be used to analyzespei regulations that enhane or onstrain investment, produtivity and growth.10A private redit bureau is dened as a private rm or nonprot organization that maintainsa database on the reditworthiness of borrowers (persons or businesses) in the nanial sys-tem and failitates the exhange of redit information among banks and nanial institutions.Credit investigative bureaus and redit reporting rms that do not diretly failitate informationexhange between nanial institutions are not onsidered.11A publi redit registry is dened as a database managed by the publi setor, usually by theentral bank or the superintendent of banks, that ollets information on the reditworthinessof borrowers (persons or businesses) in the nanial system and makes it available to nanialinstitutions.12Reported at the CD-ROM Finanial Struture and Eonomi Growth: A Cross-CountryComparison of Banks, Markets, and Development (Demirgu-Kunt, 2004).13The variable is from the Fith's BankSope database reported in Demirgu-Kunt (2004).113
GDP in purhasing power parity reported in the IMF statistis World EonomiOutlook and dummies for the legal system origin aording to La Porta et al.(1997) reeting 5 basi legal systems: ommon law (Common), Frenh ivil law(Frenh), German ivil law (German), Sandinavian law (Sandinavian) and legalsystem of transition ountries (Transition).4.5.2 Determinants of information sharingWe estimate a ross setion for 104 ountries. We run a ross setion regression forexplanatory variables in year 2002, however the data for the overage of privateand publi registries are available only from 2004.14
BureauCoveragei = β0 + β1BankConcentrationi + β2Controlsi + ǫiThe results for OLS estimations are reported in Table 4.1 in Appendix. In therst speiation we ontrol only for the level of GDP per apita in the oun-try measured in purhasing power parity. In other speiations we inlude thetoughness of reditor rights protetion and other variables suh as the overageof publi redit registry, size of the redit market and the legal origin of ountry'slegal system. The oeient by GDP has an positive sign and is statistiallysigniant. The overage of publi redit registry is negatively orrelated withthe overage of private bureau. This suggest that the publi redit registry anwork as a substitute for private bureaus. The higher degree of bank onentration(less ompetition) is orrelated with a lower overage of private redit bureau.Inluding the measure of bankrupty laws does not aet the impat of the bankonentration and oeients are statistially insigniant.14We hek that the variane in private and publi bureau overage is rather small. Betweenyears 2004 and 2005 the average overage of private registry inreased from 21.5% to 24% andoeient of orrelation is 97.5% and signiant at 1% level. The orrelation of the publiregistry overage between years 2004 and 2005 is 90%. Therefore, we an reasonably assumethat there were no large hanges between years 2002 and 2004.114
Clearly, there exists an endogeneity problem beause of reverse ausality. Onthe one hand, bank ompetition inuenes the deision of establishing the reditbureau. On the other hand the establishing of the redit registry leads to moreintensive ompetition. It is diult to disentangle the ausality diretion. There-fore, we use the instrumental variable approah. The instrumental variable ap-proah provides a solution to the problem of endogeniety by using an instrumentfor a endogenous explanatory variable.Our andidate for an instrument is a variable that reports bank overhead osts.The variable measures aounting value of a bank's overhead osts as a share of itstotal assets.15 The instrument has to satised two ondition: 1) The instrumentis not orrelated with the error term. 2) The instrument is orrelated with theendogenous variable (Bank Conentration).The rst assumption of instrumental variable approah annot be tested. Theoverhead osts, whih measures the amount of resoures used by an organizationjust to maintain existene, might serve as an instrument, beause we an reason-ably assume that the overhead osts do not inuene the banks deision to set upthe private redit bureau. In fat, the overhead osts might be orrelated with thebank onentration. In ountries with high bank onentration we observe largebanks that might inur some eonomies of sale and their overhead osts to totalassets might be lower.To hek the seond assumption we test in the linear projetion of bank on-entration onto all the exogenous variables and the instrument (bank overheadosts). We nd the oeient linked to overhead osts is negative and statisti-ally signiant. It proves the existene of partial orrelation of the instrumentwith the endogenous variable and suggests that the overhead osts variable is apossible instrument.For the estimation of the instrumental variable we use a two stage least square15The variable is from the Fith's BankSope database reported in Demirgu-Kunt (2004).115
estimator, orreting for robust standard errors. The results are presented in Ta-ble 4.2 in Appendix. We nd that ountries with more intensive bank ompetitionhave a larger overage of the private registry. Results show that if we inlude themeasures for reditor protetion the oeient of bank onentration remains neg-ative and signiant. Creditor protetion has the expeted negative sign, however,is not statistially signiant. A higher GDP per apita is assoiated with a higheroverage of the private registry. Assessing the legal origin dummies, we nd thatountries with Frenh legal origin and ountries in transition have signiantlylower overage of private registry ompare to Sandinavian ountries.Empirial evidene suggests that a market with a higher degree of the bankonentration has lower private redit registry overage. Using the instrumentalvariable approah we ontrol for the impat of the information sharing on the bankonentration (banking ompetition). This result is oherent with our theoretialndings. Our theoretial model predits also a substitution relationship betweeninformation sharing and reditor protetion. We do not nd a negative relation-ship between the quality of reditor protetion and the extension of private reditbureaus. We do not nd a signiant eet of the reditor rights protetion onthe extent of private information sharing. This might be aused by the use of in-strumental approah, the low number of observations or the fat the the reditorindex is not a good proxy for variables in our theoretial model (measurementerror).4.6 ConlusionsWe present a two period model with moral hazard and adverse seletion where de-isions on bankrupty law and information sharing are determined endogenously.In the analysis we take into aount the eet of dierent degrees of ompetition inthe redit market. We nd that there exists a parameter spae, where informationsharing is assoiated with more ompetitive markets. In this interval, the govern-116
ment has inentives to implement a tough bankrupty law to redue the moralhazard problem in a monopoly banking environment in the rst period. The side-eet of the bankrupty law solves the adverse seletion problem in the seondperiod. In a more ompetitive environment, the government does not have suhinentives to implement tough bankrupty law. In the seond period, banks haveto solve the adverse seletion problem by information sharing. Empirial evidenesuggests a positive orrelation between the ompetitiveness of redit markets andan extension of information sharing. However, we do not observe a substitutioneet between information sharing and the toughness of the bankrupty law.
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4.A AppendixProof Proposition 4.1Proof. In the rst period, the bank nanes good and bad projets, In the seondperiod, however, only good projets are naned, therefore the bank loses on thebad projets only one ((1 − q)I).
ΠbankH = q(phE[T
2
h ] + phT
1
h − 2I) − (1 − q)I
= q[ph(R −
e
ph − pl
) + ph(R +
B
ph
) − 2I] − (1 − q)I (4.19)
ΠbankL = q(plE[T
1
l ] + plT
1
l − 2I) − (1 − q)I
= 2plqR + B − (1 − q)I (4.20)To realize whih is the best option, we ompare bank's prot in the ase of high(4.19) and low eort (4.20). The prot for the high eort is larger if
e > eM ≡
(ph − pl)(2(ph − pl)qR − B)
ph
(4.21)In this ase the monopoly bank prefers to ask for the low eort and it an extratthe whole surplus of the projet.Proof Proposition 4.2Proof. Now we ompare the bank's prots from low and high eort ases.
ΠbankH = q(phT
1
h + phE[T
2
h ] + 2(1 − ph)L − 2I) − (1 − q)I (4.22)
ΠbankL = q(plT
1
l ) + plE[T
2
l ] + 2(1 − pl)L − 2I) − (1 − q)I
= 2(pl(R + L) − I) (4.23)118
Taking into aount the (B = L) we nd that the expression (4.23) is larger thanthe expression (4.22) if
e > eM ≡
2(ph − pl)
2qR
ph
(4.24)In this ase a monopoly bank prefers the manager hooses the low eort and itan extrat the whole surplus of the projet.Proof Proposition 4.3Proof. We ompare the payos of the rm in the ase high and low eort areexerted:
ΠFirmh = q(ph(R+B−T
1
h +(1−ph)B+ph(R+B−E[T
2
h ]+(1−ph)B)+(1−q)B−e
ΠFirml = q(pl(R + B − T
1
l + (1− pl)B + pl(R + B −E[T
2
l ] + (1− pl)B) + (1− q)BThe high eort is exerted if e < eC = 2(ph − pl)qR.
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Estimated using OLS. The dependent variable is Private bureau overage; Log(GDP-PPP) is logarithm of GDP per apita measured in purhasing power parity, BANKCONC on the banking market measured as a share of assets of three largest bank onthe total sum of assets, REGISTRY COVERAGE is the variable that measures over-age of publi redit registry in adult population, PRIVATE CREDIT measures privateredits by deposit money banks in ration to GDP. CREDITOR is measure of reditorprotetion index from 1 to 4 (La Porta et al., 1997), FRENCH, GERMAN, TRAN-SITION, COMMON, SCANDINAVIAN are dummies indiating legal origin (La Portaet al., 1997). Table 4.1: Estimation results : Private bureau overage(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)Constant -101.152*** -101.990*** -81.009** -66.755(24.262) (24.296) (39.032) (44.182)Bank Con. -19.337 -18.521 -24.924* -24.044*(15.175) (15.477) (13.412) (13.407)Log(GDP - PPP) 15.626*** 15.330*** 15.121*** 12.854***(2.384) (2.469) (2.634) (3.741)Creditor 1.570 2.001 1.556(2.322) (2.735) (2.748)Private Credit 9.070(10.252)Registry Coverage -0.428** -0.446**(0.201) (0.210)Common -7.822 -7.763(25.832) (26.213)Frenh -11.422 -10.110(25.449) (25.562)German -2.502 -4.328(26.569) (27.446)Transition -33.416 -29.153(25.075) (25.255)Observations 104 104 104 104
R2 0.36 0.36 0.47 0.48F statistis: 27.37 19.16 11.24 10.38Robust standard errors in parentheses* signiant at 10%; ** signiant at 5%; *** signiant at 1%
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Estimated using IV approah. Bank overhead osts as an instrument for bank onen-tration. The dependent variable is Private bureau overage; Log(GDP-PPP) logarithmof GDP per apita measured in purhasing power parity, BANKCONC on the bank-ing market measured as a share of assets of three largest bank on the total sum ofassets, REGISTRY COVERAGE is the variable that measures overage of publi reditregistry in adult population, PRIVATE CREDIT measures private redits by depositmoney banks in ration to GDP. CREDITOR is measure of reditor protetion indexfrom 1 to 4 (La Porta et al., 1997), FRENCH, GERMAN, TRANSITION, COMMON,SCANDINAVIAN are dummies indiating legal origin (La Porta et al., 1997).Table 4.2: Estimation results : Private bureau overage(IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)Constant 62.682 61.722 235.770 231.681(97.116) (96.396) (176.888) (157.589)Bank Con. -205.531** -204.357** -253.825** -252.148**(101.069) (99.820) (120.530) (108.399)Log(GDP - PPP) 10.953** 11.174** 5.350 5.685(4.679) (4.650) (6.855) (7.292)Creditor -0.949 -1.651 -1.572(4.068) (5.185) (5.194)Private Credit -1.036(20.108)Registry Coverage -0.050 -0.051(0.455) (0.454)Common -79.629 -79.078(51.970) (49.710)Frenh -95.656* -95.152*(55.059) (52.685)German -75.450 -74.675(52.363) (50.105)Transition -112.247** -112.122**(52.715) (52.037)Observations 104 104 104 104F statistis: 13.00 9.22 3.99 3.61Robust standard errors in parentheses* signiant at 10%; ** signiant at 5%
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